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CAITLIN S. DYCKMAN*
Another Case of the Century?
Comparing the Legacy and Potential
Implications of Arizona v. California
and the South Carolina v. North
Carolina Proceedings
ABSTRACT
With growing demand throughout the United States, water alloca-
tion is shifting from traditional institutionally favored water users
(i.e., agricultural and hydropower industries) to more wealthy urban
centers through interbasin transfers and environmental flow restora-
tion for endangered species. Even in the traditionally wet Southeast,
this creates a powerful new tension between states. In a precedent-
setting action in June 2007, South Carolina brought suit in the U.S.
Supreme Court against the state of North Carolina over the approved
interbasin transfer of 13 million gallons per day from the Catawba-
Wateree River to two North Carolina cities, Concord and Kan-
napolis, in the Yadkin-Pee Dee River basin. This article examines the
progression of the lawsuit and its settlement, using a triangulation
of legal research and primary and secondary historical documents to
compare the proceedings with those of the events in the seminal Colo-
rado River lawsuit, Arizona v. California. The findings reveal that
although most of the decisive water law precedent originates in the
arid West, the present suit has the potential to set a new course in
eastern water law, with bearing on future parens patriae legal
strategies in interstate water disputes.
I. INTRODUCTION
The U.S. Supreme Court’s seminal holding in Arizona v. California1
was one of the most protracted water battles in the western United States
* Caitlin S. Dyckman, J.D., Ph.D., (cdyckma@clemson.edu) is an Assistant Professor
in the Department of Planning & Landscape Architecture at Clemson University. Her
teaching and research interests focus on environmental planning and natural resource
management and law, with an emphasis on the land-water nexus. She wishes to thank
Harrison “Hap” Dunning and W. Michael Hanemann for their insightful comments and
encouragement on earlier versions of this article, as well as Tony Burchell, Ashleigh Morris,
Nick Pino, Maggie Lane, and the rest of the NRJ editors for their dedicated editorial efforts
and commitment to excellence.
1. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963). Unless otherwise noted, Arizona v. Cali-
fornia refers to this 1963 opinion.
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and has been dubbed the “Case of the Century.”2 It represents the David
and Goliath story in water law, with a small state challenging and pre-
vailing over the largest water-consuming state on the largest southwest-
ern river, the Colorado. Native American intervenors ultimately reaped
the greatest benefit from the holding, garnering entitlement to a substan-
tial portion of Arizona’s share.3
Although the Catawba-Wateree River originates in the North Car-
olina mountains and extends through South Carolina’s Sandhills region
to eventually join the Broad River that terminates in the Atlantic Ocean,
it has nowhere near the volume or majesty of the Colorado.4 However,
its flow is the source of what may be considered the next “Case of the
Century,” as it provides hydroelectric power, economic development,
recreation, and drinking water for both states. Like the State of Arizona,
South Carolina challenged its neighboring state’s use of the shared water
source by filing a parens patriae suit5 against North Carolina in the U.S.
Supreme Court in June 2007.6 The repercussions of the settlement are
2. See JACK L. AUGUST, JR., DIVIDING WESTERN WATERS: MARK WILMER AND ARIZONA V.
CALIFORNIA xvi–xvii (2007); see also NORRIS HUNDLEY, JR., THE GREAT THIRST: CALIFORNIANS
AND WATER: A HISTORY 305 (2001) (stating that “the trial in Arizona v. California became one
of the longest, most expensive, and most hotly contested in U.S. Supreme Court history.”).
3. See Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. at 596, 600 (holding that the Native Americans
were entitled to 1,000,000 acre-feet annually, determined by 135,000 acres of irrigable land,
also known as an irrigable acreage standard); see also MARC REISNER, CADILLAC DESERT: THE
AMERICAN WEST AND ITS DISAPPEARING WATER 260–62 (1986).
4. The Catawba-Wateree River flows for 300 miles from North Carolina into South
Carolina, and was named America’s Most Endangered River in 2008 by American Rivers.
See About the Catawba-Wateree River, CATAWBA RIVERKEEPER FOUNDATION, http://www.cat-
awbariverkeeper.org/about-the-catawba/catawba-wateree-facts/ (last visited Apr. 19,
2011). In contrast, the Colorado River flows for 1,450 miles to the Gulf of California from its
headwaters in Colorado. See William Arthur Atkins, Colorado River Basin, WATER ENCYCLO-
PEDIA: SCIENCE AND ISSUES, http://www.waterencyclopedia.com/Ce-Cr/Colorado-River-
Basin.html (last visited Apr. 19, 2011).
5. See Joseph W. Dellapenna, Interstate Struggles Over Rivers: The Southeastern States
and the Struggle Over the “Hooch,” 12 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 828, 882–84 (2005) (stating that
“[t]he Supreme Court announced at the beginning of the twentieth century that a state had
the authority to bring disputes between states or between a state and a citizen of another
state over resource management before the Court on a parens patriae basis even when the
state had no direct interest in the resources apart from representing its citizens. In a parens
patriae suit, citizens of a state involved in the litigation cannot participate independently in
the suit unless they show a compelling interest apart from their interest as a citizen of the
state.”).
6. Motion of the State of South Carolina for Leave to File Complaint, Complaint, and
Brief in Support of its Motion for Leave to File Complaint, South Carolina v. North Caro-
lina, 130 S. Ct. 854 (2010) (No. 06-138), 2007 WL 3283683 [hereinafter Motion, Complaint &
Brief in Support], available at http://www.mto.com/sm/docs/5400335_1.pdf. See http://
www.supremecourt.gov/Search.aspx?FileName/docketfiles/22o138.htm for the Supreme
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projected to ripple throughout other large eastern riparian and regulated
riparian systems, including the Savannah River.7
Given this potential, South Carolina v. North Carolina8 warrants
comparison with Arizona v. California, despite eastern equitable appor-
tionment precedent in New Jersey v. New York.9 This article analyzes the
South Carolina v. North Carolina proceedings and settlement, assessing
their potential to set as much eastern precedent as Arizona v. California
did for western water law. It also evaluates the broader implications of
the case in modern water disputes, particularly in terms of growth ex-
pectations and a legally empowered environmental paradigm.
II. METHODOLOGY
This article makes a comparative assessment of the factual and
legal circumstances of each case, in order to draw parallels and introduce
potential lessons for other parens patriae suits from the South Carolina
and Arizona experiences. The author uses legal and historical research,
analyzing the following: pleadings for South Carolina v. North Carolina;
the Special Master’s reports and ultimate holding in Arizona v. California;
and other primary and secondary historical sources, particularly related
to the latter, as South Carolina v. North Carolina was recently settled on
December 10, 2010,10 and dismissed on December 14, 2010.11
III. PROCEDURAL PROGRESSION/MILESTONES IN EACH CASE
There have been numerous accounts and perspectives related to
the Arizona holding, including the events precipitating the filing,12 the
Court official docket sheet, and http://www.mto.com/sm for links to papers filed directly
with the Special Master.
7. See Mark Davis, Preparing for Apportionment: Lessons from the Catawba River, 2 SEA
GRANT L. & POL’Y J. 44, 54–55 (2009–2010) (by accepting the case, the Court “seems also to
be preparing itself for a new generation of apportionment cases and sending the message
to other states to pay attention and begin preparing for the new water reality that even
‘water rich’ states now face.”).
8. South Carolina v. North Carolina, 130 S. Ct. 854 (2010) (overruling in part and
sustaining in part South Carolina’s exceptions to the Special Master’s report on the inter-
venor status of non-state entities), and complaint dismissed, 131 S. Ct. 855 (2010) (mem.), and
131 S. Ct. 975 (2011) (mem.) (discharging the Special Master).
9. New Jersey v. New York, 345 U.S. 369 (1953).
10. Settlement Agreement, South Carolina v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 855 (2010)
(mem.) (No. 06-138) (dismissing the complaint).
11. Stipulation for Dismissal, South Carolina v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 855 (2010).
12. AUGUST, supra note 2, at 43–59; REISNER, supra note 3, at 257–61; HUNDLEY, supra R
note 2, at 303–307. R
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actual 11-year battle,13 and the aftermath of the holding.14 Over 40 years
later, in 2006, the Court issued another binding decree.15 This work relies
on those accounts to augment the Special Master’s Report (1960)16 and
the 1963 holding itself to give an overview of the procedural and legal
milestones in the case, creating a comparative baseline for the South Caro-
lina v. North Carolina proceedings and settlement.
A. Arizona v. California
Arizona’s initial arguments in its bill of complaint rested on the
concept of equity in the Lower Colorado River, despite the fact that Cali-
fornia had perfected its right under a prior appropriation standard to
5.362 million acre-feet per year, which was being put to beneficial use
through delivery contracts.17 This was a higher volume than the 4.4 mil-
lion acre-feet statutorily allocated in the Colorado River Compact of
1922, the Boulder Canyon Project Act of 1928, and the California Limita-
tion Act of 1929, collectively known as the “Law of the River.”18 The prior
appropriation water-rights structure was used in all states that were
party to the Colorado River Compact.19 Even though Arizona was suffer-
ing actual economic effects from lack of water, and its communities were
overdrafting their groundwater supplies,20 Arizona could not assert a le-
gal claim to the water through prior appropriation because it was not yet
using the water and when/if it did, Arizona would be junior to senior
rights holders in California.21 California was effectively perfecting water
13. AUGUST, supra note 2, at 59–97. R
14. Id. at 99–114; see also REISNER, supra note 3, at 262–65. R
15. Arizona v. California, 547 U.S. 150 (2006).
16. Report of the Special Master, Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963) (No. 8).
17. AUGUST, supra note 2, at 62. R
18. JOSEPH L. SAX ET AL., LEGAL CONTROL OF WATER RESOURCES 799 (2006) (stating that
“this ‘Law’ consists of an intricate me´lange of interstate compacts, federal statutes, regula-
tions, court decisions, contracts, and state law.”).
19. AUGUST, supra note 2, at 69. R
20. HUNDLEY, supra note 2, at 304–305. R
21. To perfect a water right under a prior appropriative standard, an individual must
get there first, also known as “first in time is first in right,” Irwin v. Phillips, 5 Cal. 140
(1855), and show intent to apply the water to beneficial use, obtain actual physical control
of the water through diversion (depending on the state and its environmental flow protec-
tion statutes), and apply the flow to beneficial use, Empire Water & Power Co. v. Cascade
Town Co., 205 F. 123 (8th Cir. 1913) (where recreation was not considered a beneficial use).
Although the Colorado River Compact of 1922, which Arizona did not ratify until 1944,
allocated 2.8 million acre-feet of the lower Colorado River to Arizona, it lacked the ability
to physically divert the water from the system. The users were in central parts of Arizona,
and the state required a significant infrastructure investment to move the water to these
areas. Consequently, Arizona’s users could not perfect their water rights under an appro-
priative system, while Southern California benefited from their lobbying for the federally
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rights to more than its statutory allocation of 4.4 million acre-feet and
arguing that Arizona had alternate sources (i.e., the Colorado tributaries,
the Gila and Salt rivers).22 Arizona argued that it was entitled to the Gila
since it was salvaged water.23 Without a viable legal theory, the attorneys
for Arizona “realized that Arizona had charged out of the gates and
stumbled badly; they began to realize that they needed to sharpen their
legal theory, modify their legal team, or both; or else they would lose the
case.”24
A change in legal counsel in the spring of 1957 shifted the entire
strategy for Arizona. Instead of contending with perfected water rights
and priority, Arizona invoked the supremacy of a federal statutory allo-
cation through the Law of the River.25 The new counsel, Mark Wilmer,
argued that Congress’s passage of the Boulder Canyon Project Act26 in
1928, and the subsequent construction of Boulder Canyon Dam, indi-
cated Congress’s intent to assert control, akin to “dominant servitude”
over the main stem of the river.27 And when “the federal government
assumed control of the river, to the extent at least that it intended to and
did exercise its dominant servitude over and in the waters of the river,
all other rights, howsoever they may be catalogued, ceased.”28 As a result
of the dam’s construction, Congress had the ability to determine the dis-
tribution of the water it stored.29
But Congress had not directly addressed the tributaries to the Col-
orado, particularly the Gila River.30 Arizona had perfected prior appro-
priative rights to this source, but California was arguing that under
Article 3(b) of the Colorado River Compact31of 1922, the Gila constituted
surplus water to which California and Nevada were each entitled. As a
result, California would prevail on the mainstream, because Arizona was
receiving more than its allocation of the surplus.32 Wilmer again changed
the course of the argument, using legislative history in the Congressional
constructed All-American Canal and the Metropolitan Water District’s bond-financed Col-
orado River Aqueduct.
22. AUGUST, supra note 2, at 80–82. R
23. Mark Wilmer, Arizona v. California, A Statutory Construction Case, 6 ARIZ. L. REV.
40, 51 (1964–65).
24. AUGUST, supra note 2, at 65. R
25. Wilmer, supra note 23, at 63. R
26. Boulder Canyon Project Act, H.R. 5773, 70th Cong. (1928).
27. Id.; AUGUST, supra note 2, at 81–85. R
28. Wilmer, supra note 23, at 63 (using United States v. Twin City Power Co., 350 U.S. 259 R
(1956) to justify this reasoning).
29. AUGUST, supra note 2, at 77. R
30. Wilmer, supra note 23, at 52. R
31. Colorado River Compact of 1922, COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-61-101 (2002).
32. AUGUST, supra note 2, at 79–80. R
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Record and Article 8 of the same compact, which stated that prior per-
fected rights were safe from the terms of the compact.33 That argument
preserved Arizona’s claim to 2.8 million acre-feet on the mainstream. Af-
ter the 1960 Special Master’s Report to the U.S. Supreme Court—Arizona
ultimately prevailed in 196334—the Court agreed that the Boulder Can-
yon Project Act controlled the mainstream of the Colorado, conveniently
excluding the Gila River and other appropriated tributaries.35
And yet, Arizona had to share its victory, ceding a substantial
portion of its 2.8 million acre-feet to federal reserved water rights for
Native American tribes, through an extension of the Winters doctrine.36
Although not explicitly relying upon it, the Court followed the Federal
Power Commission v. Oregon holding that extended the federally reserved
water rights to non-Native American federal lands, and ruled that the
Native American tribes were entitled to Lower Colorado River water for
present and future needs, as determined by the practically irrigable acre-
age quantification standard.37
B. South Carolina v. North Carolina
In contrast, the South Carolina complaint was based on entirely
different grounds, involving North Carolina interbasin transfers (IBT)
and a state-initiated statutory form of regulated riparianism.38 According
to the bill of complaint, North Carolina adopted an IBT statute in 199139
that regulates transfers over 2 million gallons per day and established a
review process for affected parties in the watershed.40 Since 1991, North
33. Id. at 79–81.
34. Report of the Special Master, supra note 16; Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 R
(1963).
35. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. at 565–69, 590–91; Wilmer, supra note 23, at 52–53; R
Edward W. Clyde, The Colorado River Decision—1963, 8 UTAH L. REV. 299, 304 (1962–64).
36. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. at 596, 600; REISNER, supra note 3, at 261–62. The R
Winters Doctrine, first articulated in Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908), states that
whenever Congress creates a reservation of land, an implied reservation of water is created
in order to fulfill the purposes of the reservation.
37. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. at 596, 600. The Court set precedent in federal and
Native American reserved rights doctrine in two ways. First, it applied the Winters Doc-
trine to non-Native American federally reserved lands, reserving rights to water with any
federal land reservation through interpretation that silence implies reservation. Second, for
Native American reservations of water, the Court followed Fed. Power Comm’n v. Oregon,
349 U.S. 435 (1955), to increase that reservation for future needs, so they are not limited by
current population demands on Native American lands.
38. Motion, Complaint & Brief in Support, supra note 6. R
39. Motion, Complaint & Brief in Support, supra note 6, Complaint at 2 (describing R
aspects of N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-215.22 (2010)).
40. Id., Brief at 6–7.
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Carolina has authorized the transfer of over 48 million gallons per day
from the Catawba-Wateree River to other in-state basins.41 North Caro-
lina uses a variation of a regulated riparian water rights system, which
was first adopted in 1967.42 South Carolina was formerly a riparian state,
but changed to a regulated riparian system through S. 452,43 South Caro-
lina’s Water Withdrawal Act, adopted June 11, 2010.44
Despite the recommendation of an interstate commission to wait
six months, the North Carolina Environmental Management Commis-
sion approved an IBT of 10 million gallons per day from the Catawba-
Wateree River to two North Carolina cities in the Rocky River basin in
January 2007.45 Meanwhile, South Carolina and North Carolina purport-
edly attempted to enter into a compact on the river.46 But the January
2007 transfer approval, which South Carolina opposed, caused the state
to forgo further compact negotiations and to file suit under Article III,
Section 2, clause 2 of the U.S. Constitution, and 28 U.S.C. Section
1251(a).47 South Carolina sought an injunction of North Carolina’s IBTs
from the Catawba-Wateree River, an equitable apportionment of the
same, and appointment of a Special Master, enjoining North Carolina
from any other transfers that violate the apportionment, once instated as
a remedy.48
The bill of complaint presented two main issues; whether North
Carolina’s transfer statute is invalid because it allows North Carolina to
use more than its equitable share of the Catawba-Wateree River, causing
downstream users injury, and whether that injury should be remedied
41. Id., Complaint at 1, Brief at 1.
42. Water Use Act of 1967, 1967 N.C. Laws, ch. 933, § 1 (codified as N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 143-215.11 (2010)).
43. Motion, Complaint & Brief in Support, supra note 6, Brief at 1. R
44. South Carolina Surface Water Withdrawal, Permitting, Use, and Reporting Act,
2010 S.C. Sess. Laws Reg. Sess. Act 247 (codified as amended at S.C. Code Ann. § 49-4-10
(2010)).
45. Motion, Complaint & Brief in Support, supra note 6, Brief at 7–9. R
46. See Marjorie Riddle, S.C. Is Ready for Water War with N.C.—State to Sue If Cities
Given OK to Draw Water from Catawba, THE STATE, Jan. 8, 2007, at A1. “But N.C. commission
chairman David Moreau said it’s too late to consider an interstate compact to resolve the
Catawba issue. ‘It’s a very long process,’ he said. ‘It would take years of negotiation to
bring the compact about. We’ve delayed the decision twice and held two very large public
meetings to gather additional information. We’ve heard what people have to say.’ The N.C.
commission is acting on the proposal because water would be withdrawn from parts of the
Catawba in that state.”
47. Motion, Complaint & Brief in Support, supra note 6, Brief at 2. R
48. Id.; Application of the State of South Carolina for a Preliminary Injunction, South
Carolina v. North Carolina, 128 S. Ct. 349 (2007) (mem.) (No. 06-A1150) (denying prelimi-
nary injunction and granting motion for leave to file a bill of complaint), available at http://
www.mto.com/sm/docs/4462131_1.pdf.
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with equitable apportionment and appointment of a Special Master.49 To
support its claim, South Carolina argued that there is historic volume
variability in the Catawba-Wateree’s natural flow as determined in the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) relicensing process for
Duke Energy’s power plants on the river,50 and that it is subject to pro-
longed droughts that have affected South Carolina as the downstream
user.51 Using expert opinion, South Carolina demonstrated that the com-
bination of North Carolina’s January 2007 transfer and earlier transfers52
cumulatively exceeded the Catawba-Wateree’s dependable flow.53
South Carolina also argued that federal common law trumps state
statutes54 in resolving the interstate river issues on the Catawba-Wateree
49. Motion, Complaint & Brief in Support, supra note 6, Brief at 9–14. R
50. Id. at 4–5. Duke Energy began the comprehensive planning process for the relic-
ensing application of its Catawba-Wateree Hydro Project in June 2003. According to Bow-
man, “[a]ll hydropower dams not owned by the federal government must obtain an
operating license from FERC, unless the dam has been issued an exemption or is on a
nonnavigable river (US Code, title 16, sec. 797[e]). When these 30- to 50-year licenses expire,
the dam owner must reapply to FERC to obtain a new license (US Code, title 16, sec. 808).
As part of this licensing process, FERC must determine whether issuing a new license is in
the public interest, providing equal consideration to power development and nonpower
uses of the river (e.g., fish and wildlife habitat, recreation, aesthetics) (US Code, title 16, sec.
797[e]).” Margaret E. Bowman, Legal Perspectives on Dam Removal, 52 BIOSCI. 739, 740 (2002).
To ensure compatible accommodation of all beneficial public purposes on the river system
while maintaining hydropower generation, license applicants must create a comprehensive
plan to improve the water system on which the project is located. 16 U.S.C. §§ 802(a)(1),
803(a). After a three-year process, the Comprehensive Relicensing Agreement for the Ca-
tawba-Wateree Hydro Project was signed in August 2006, then revised and filed with
FERC in December 2006. COMPREHENSIVE RELICENSING AGREEMENT FOR THE CATAWBA-WA-
TEREE HYDRO PROJECT FERC PROJECT NO. 2232 at 3–5 (Dec. 22, 2006) [hereinafter COMPRE-
HENSIVE RELICENSING AGREEMENT], available at http://www.duke-energy.com/catawba-
wateree-relicensing/final-agreement-summaries.asp (click on Catawba-Wateree Final
Agreement Signature Copy). It corresponds to and is a vital component of the actual license
still to be issued by FERC. Settlement Agreement, supra note 10, at 2. R
51. Motion, Complaint & Brief in Support, supra note 6, Brief at 4–6. For instance, R
South Carolina describes particular economic harm (or its potential) in the 1998–2002
drought on the Catawba River, which is subject to significant fluctuations in level. Id. at 5.
The drought purportedly caused the water from the Wateree to be “undrinkable” in the city
of Camden, due to high algal content. Id.
52. Which are perfected claims through N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-215.22 (2010).
53. Motion, Complaint & Brief in Support, supra note 6, app. at 17a (Ex. 4: Affidavit of R
Dr. A. W. Badr (May 31, 2007)) (stating “that natural hydrologic conditions can cause insuf-
ficient flows in the Catawba River at any time of the year, and during severe droughts, the
minimum flow requirement of 1,100 cfs may not be met for months at a time. Hydrologic
conditions can result in periods when the basin does not have enough water to maintain
the Catawba River at even minimally adequate flows, and during these times, transfers of
even relatively small volumes of water out of the basin in North Carolina will further re-
duce the Catawba River flow, increasing the hardship for water users in South Carolina.”).
54. E.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-215.22I.
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River.55 Consequently, the North Carolina transfer statute was deemed
an inadequate resolution tool in an interstate river dispute, particularly
because the North Carolina Environmental Management Commission
need only consider “a number of factors . . . in granting a permit, all of
which on their face pertain only to North Carolina’s interests.”56 As a
remedy, South Carolina argued that it was entitled to equitable appor-
tionment, and that North Carolina should take action consistent with
that apportionment after the appointment of a Special Master.57
North Carolina filed a reply brief,58 the Court granted certiorari,59
and a month later Duke Energy and the Catawba River Water Supply
Project (CRWSP) filed motions to intervene.60 On January 15, 2008, the
Court then assigned the first female Special Master in the country, Kris-
tin Linsley Myles, which is a landmark in itself.61 Shortly thereafter, the
City of Charlotte, North Carolina, filed a motion to intervene.62 South
Carolina opposed all three intervenors.63 Special Master Myles issued an
order granting Duke Energy, CRWSP, and the City of Charlotte inter-
55. Motion, Complaint & Brief in Support, supra note 6, Brief at 10–12. R
56. Motion, Complaint & Brief in Support, supra note 6, Brief at 6 (referencing N.C. R
GEN. STAT. § 143-215.22I(f)).
57. Id. at 11–14.
58. Brief of the State of North Carolina in Opposition on Motion for Leave to File Bill
of Complaint, South Carolina v. North Carolina, 130 S. Ct. 854 (2010) (No. 06-138), available
at http://www.mto.com/sm/docs/4462349_1.pdf.
59. Order Granting Motion for Leave to File Complaint, South Carolina v. North Caro-
lina, 128 S. Ct. 349 (2007) (mem.) (No. 06-138), available at http://www.mto.com/sm/docs/
5245735_1.pdf.
60. Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC’s Motion and Brief in Support of Motion to Intervene
and File Answer, and Answer, South Carolina v. North Carolina, 130 S. Ct. 854 (2010) (No.
06-138), available at http://www.mto.com/sm/docs/4724461_1.pdf; Motion of the Ca-
tawba River Water Supply Project for Leave to Intervene and Brief in Support of the Mo-
tion, South Carolina v. North Carolina, 130 S. Ct. 854 (2010) (No. 06-138), available at http://
www.mto.com/sm/docs/4462956_1.pdf.
61. Kristin Linsley Myles Order of Appointment as Special Master, South Carolina v.
North Carolina, 552 U.S. 1160 (2008) (mem.) (No. 06-138).
62. Motion for Leave to Intervene of the City of Charlotte, North Carolina, and Brief in
support of Motion, South Carolina v. North Carolina, 130 S. Ct. 854 (2010) (No. 06-138),
available at http://www.mto.com/sm/docs/4995436_1.pdf.
63. Brief of the State of South Carolina in Opposition to Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC’s
Motion for Leave to Intervene and File Answer, South Carolina v. North Carolina, 130 S.
Ct. 854 (2010) (No. 06-138), available at http://www.mto.com/sm/docs/4463040_1.pdf;
Brief of the State of South Carolina in Opposition to Motion of the Catawba River Water
Supply Project for Leave to Intervene, South Carolina v. North Carolina, 130 S. Ct. 854
(2010) (No. 06-138), available at http://www.mto.com/sm/docs/4463164_1.pdf; Brief of the
State of South Carolina in Opposition to Motion for Leave to Intervene of the City of Char-
lotte, South Carolina v. North Carolina, 130 S. Ct. 854 (2010) (No. 06-138), available at
http://www.mto.com/sm/docs/4548495_1.pdf.
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venor status in May 2008,64 and, despite resistance,65 reaffirmed her deci-
sion in her First Interim Report filed with the Court in November 2008.66
The U.S. Supreme Court heard oral argument on October 13, 2009,67 and
on January 20, 2010, ruled that Duke Energy and CRWSP met the inter-
venor standard, but that the City of Charlotte’s interests were adequately
represented by the State of North Carolina in parens patriae.68
After additional legal maneuvering (see APPENDIX, Table 1), Spe-
cial Master Myles issued an order regarding the structure of trial and
discovery, in which she affirmed her telephonic ruling that the case
would no longer be bifurcated.69 Each party would have the opportunity
for discovery on any relevant issue, after which, if South Carolina could
show sufficient harm in a broader sense and entitlement to equitable ap-
portionment, the Special Master would hold another trial “on the con-
tours of that remedy.”70 Immediately following the release of this ruling,
the Special Master held another—and the last—telephonic conference in
response to a settlement concept that was initiated in letters submitted
by counsel.71
This settlement concept began in a parallel set of actions, set into
motion in August 2010 at a meeting of the Catawba-Wateree River Basin
Advisory Commission (Bi-State Commission),72 but originating long
before that meeting through other events/actions. In a cooperative effort
64. Order Granting Motions for Leave to Intervene of the City of Charlotte, North
Carolina, Catawba River Water Supply Project, and Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC, South
Carolina v. North Carolina, 130 S. Ct. 854 (2010) (No. 06-138), available at http://www.mto.
com/sm/docs/5201990_1.pdf.
65. Motion of South Carolina for Clarification or, in the Alternative, for Reconsidera-
tion of May 27, 2008, Order Granting Limited Intervention, South Carolina v. North Caro-
lina, 130 S. Ct. 854 (2010) (No. 06-138), available at http://www.mto.com/sm/docs/
5386049_1.pdf.
66. First Interim Report of the Special Master, South Carolina v. North Carolina, 130 S.
Ct. 854 (2010) (No. 06-138), available at http://www.mto.com/sm/docs/6523714_1.pdf.
67. Transcript of Oral Argument Before the U.S. Supreme Court, South Carolina v.
North Carolina, 130 S. Ct. 854 (2010) (No. 06-138), available at http://www.mto.com/sm/
docs/9141431_1.pdf.
68. South Carolina v. North Carolina, 130 S. Ct. 854.
69. Order Regarding Structure of Trial and Discovery, South Carolina v. North Caro-
lina, 130 S. Ct. 854 (2010) (No. 06-138), available at http://www.mto.com/sm/docs/
12402469.pdf.
70. Id. at 14.
71. Transcript of Telephonic Conference Before the Special Master Kristin Linsley
Myles, South Carolina v. North Carolina, 130 S. Ct. 854 (2010) (No. 06-138) [hereinafter
Telephonic Conference Nov. 22, 2010], available at http://www.mto.com/sm/docs/
CONF11222010.pdf.
72. Joint Settlement Concept at ll. 5–10, South Carolina v. North Carolina, 130 S. Ct.
854 (on file with the Natural Resources Journal).
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in 2004 in response to sustained drought, both South Carolina and North
Carolina enacted legislation creating river basin advisory commissions,
one of which included the Catawba-Wateree River.73 Additionally, in
2003, as part of its FERC relicensing application for the Catawba-Wateree
Hydro Project, Duke Energy initiated a lengthy and inclusive compre-
hensive planning process, which was finalized in August 2006. The re-
sulting agreement is formally known as the Comprehensive Relicensing
Agreement (CRA) and includes “70 signatories who are stakeholders in
the Catawba-Wateree River Basin . . . [as] the result of a public, multi-
stakeholder process that involved approximately 58,000 person-hours
over a three-year period.”74
In response to this effort, the Bi-State Commission adopted a mo-
tion on August 27, 2010, that instructed the parties to “use the [CRA] as a
starting point for settlement negotiations and include the Bi-State Com-
mission in the process.”75 All of the parties agreed to do so.76 On Novem-
ber 12, 2010, they submitted proposed settlement language, known as the
“Joint Settlement Concept” to the Bi-State Commission for a public com-
ment period.77 This concept cited official reasons for working toward a
settlement: equity; cost to both tax and ratepayers; and, a desire for the
states to maintain a cooperative, rather than antagonistic relationship
with each other.78 The parties “believe that it is important that the States
regard each other as close neighbors, which share the Catawba-Wateree
River, rather than as a plaintiff and a defendant in a lawsuit and that this
Agreement will be a model for regional cooperation.”79 After approval
from the respective states and Duke Energy, passage by the county
73. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 77-110 to 77-124 (2010); S.C. CODE ANN. REGS. §§ 44-59-10 to 44-
59-70 (2010). The Bi-State Commission comprises 15 members that reside in the basin, in-
cluding North Carolina and South Carolina legislators, a Duke Energy official, a nonprofit
representative, a water utility representative, a homeowners’ association representative,
etc., each of whom are variably appointed. Although a permanent entity, this commission
has a purely advisory role for agencies with regulatory authority over the use of the basin’s
water, and is supported by staff from the South Carolina Department of Health and Envi-
ronmental Control, and the North Carolina Department of Environmental and Natural
Resources.
74. Joint Settlement Concept, supra note 72, at ll. 23–27. R
75. Id.; Settlement Agreement, supra note 10, at 1. R
76. Given the effort, expense, detail, and sheer number of users included in the CRA,
the settlement agreement’s recitals state the parties’ consensus that the CRA is “an appro-
priate foundation for resolution of this Litigation and that they should each commit to
continue to work together to help the CRA achieve its intended purposes and deliver its
agreed-upon provisions throughout its intended duration.” Settlement Agreement, supra
note 10, at 2. R
77. Joint Settlement Concept, supra note 72. R
78. Id.
79. Settlement Agreement, supra note 10, at 1. R
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boards for CRWSP,80 examination and approval by the Special Master,81
the settlement agreement—virtually identical to the settlement concept—
was signed on December 10, 2010, and the case was dismissed by the
U.S. Supreme Court on December 14, 2010.
IV. COMPARISON OF THE TWO CASES
A. Similarities
1. Factual Similarities
The primary factual similarity is the disparate power relationship
between the plaintiff and the defendant. Both California and North Caro-
lina were in stronger economic positions than the plaintiff states in each
case and were consistently more developed (legally, physically, economi-
cally, etc.). Both also had an interest in delaying the outcome, because
each could continue to consume during litigation82—watering thirsty
Southern California or the greater Charlotte metropolitan statistical area.
Arizona and South Carolina are somewhat similarly situated, de-
spite a larger GDP (Gross Domestic Product) disparity between Arizona
and California than between South Carolina and North Carolina.83 They
each sought to grow and/or reserve the potential to do so for economic
and social reasons. Neither had an interest in delay, as Arizona had al-
ready depleted its surface water and was rapidly diminishing its
groundwater aquifers in the 1950s,84 and South Carolina was experienc-
ing economic and some drinking water effects from drought-induced
low flows in the Wateree in 2006.85
80. Telephonic Conference Nov. 22, 2010, supra note 71, at 6–7. R
81. Id.
82. AUGUST, supra note 2, at 63 (stating that “California attorneys commenced a cam- R
paign of judicial delay. A blizzard of motions and filings postponed the start of the pro-
ceedings, while the number and complexity of the issues raised prompted the Court to
appoint a special master to hear arguments.”).
83. The GDP for industry by SIC (standard industrial classification) codes for Arizona
and California in 1963 was $4,482 and $77,809 million (in current dollars), respectively,
according to the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis. Gross Domestic Product by State, BUREAU
OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, http://www.bea.gov/regional/gsp (last visited May 24, 2011).
Comparatively, in 2007, South Carolina and North Carolina had a GDP for industry by
NAICS (North American Industry Classification System) codes of $157,636 and $3,953,115
million (in current dollars), respectively. Id.
84. HUNDLEY, supra note 2, at 305; REISNER, supra note 3, at 260 (stating that “Arizona R
had reversed the pattern of some western states—it had fully developed its surface water
first, and then began to overdraft its groundwater. Except for its Colorado River entitle-
ment—whatever it was—it literally had nothing left.”); AUGUST, supra note 2, at 52; SAX ET R
AL., supra note 18, at 806. R
85. Motion, Complaint & Brief in Support, supra note 6. R
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Although battling in different venues (i.e., congressional or state
environmental commission hearings), Arizona, California, South Caro-
lina, and North Carolina were similarly unable to establish trust in water
allocation amongst their political leadership. After secretive and overt
disputes between the states, with politicians using the water allocation
issue for their personal political agendas, the political underdogs Ari-
zona and South Carolina made aggressive legal moves by filing bills of
complaint for parens patriae suits. And yet, for the most part, each state
“had no consistent statewide water policy, its political leadership was
divided, and . . . California [or North Carolina], in its inherent complex-
ity, had nevertheless proceeded in a unified fashion concerning her
claims to the river.”86
2. Legal Similarities
In both suits, there was struggle in the cause of action itself. The
stated issue in South Carolina’s original bill of complaint is entirely sepa-
rate from the real issue, which is quite similar to the fundamental one in
Arizona v. California; namely, the “basis of controversy . . . lies in the
choice between the future development of central Arizona and the ex-
pansion of California uses.”87 South Carolina and North Carolina, respec-
tively, could have been substituted in that sentence.
Consequently, there was legal jockeying for advantage regarding
the scope of the resource at issue. As previously mentioned, in Arizona v.
California, the parties debated the inclusion of the Gila River and other
tributaries in the volumetric allocation or whether the action was limited
to the main stem of the Colorado River. California sought to include the
tributaries, which would provide the majority of Arizona’s 2.8 million
acre-feet entitlement under the Colorado River Compact, while Arizona
opposed the inclusion and argued that the dispute solely involved the
main stem.
In South Carolina v. North Carolina, South Carolina initially sug-
gested expansion of the scope to the entire Catawba-Wateree River sys-
tem (including tributaries),88 while North Carolina sought to limit the
86. AUGUST, supra note 2, at 44 (citing to Wilmer’s interpretation of Arizona’s position R
after the Arizona v. California (1931) holding).
87. Frank J. Trelease, Arizona v. California: Allocation of Water Resources to People, States,
and Nation, 1963 SUP. CT. REV. 158, 164 (1963).
88. Telephonic Conference Nov. 22, 2010, supra note 71, at 30–32, 51–52; see also South R
Carolina’s Ninth Progress Report at 1–2, South Carolina v. North Carolina, 130 S. Ct. 854
(2010) (No. 06-138) (where the state agrees to “limit its showing of harms to the Catawba
River Basin to points north of the confluence of the Wateree River and the Congaree River.
South Carolina does not intend to rely on harms south of that point.”), available at http://
www.mto.com/sm/docs/6525070_1.pdf.
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complaint spatially (to particular stretches of the river), temporally (dur-
ing drought), and to particular actions (IBT).89 North Carolina “con-
tinue[d] to preserve its position that the Bill of Complaint is limited to
interbasin transfers and that the Complaint is limited to harms during
times of drought and harms in a limited segment of the river.”90
Additionally, both Arizona and South Carolina faced daunting
and somewhat untenable legal hurdles. South Carolina asserted evidence
of harm primarily during times of drought, thus acknowledging that ad-
equate volumes are generally present on the river (despite the Catawba-
Wateree’s variability). It argued that drought should be the baseline for
the showing of harm, per the holding in Nebraska v. Wyoming,91 while
North Carolina argued that South Carolina lacked harm otherwise, and
the legal standard should exclude times of drought for determination of
harm. Arguably, North Carolina was also harmed during drought.92
Arizona’s initial hurdle was even more daunting, as it was chal-
lenging a state that had perfected appropriative water rights to 5.3 mil-
lion acre-feet a year, despite the Boulder Canyon Project Act allocation of
4.4.93 Should Arizona have wanted to use 900,000 acre-feet per year, they
had no infrastructure to transfer the allocation and put it to beneficial
use. Arizona “lacked a legal theory, like prior appropriation, to support
its case.”94 And in fact, it would not have been able to meet the (albeit
somewhat nebulous) threatened injury standard of an equitable appor-
tionment suit, had it continued to pursue a common law approach. By
switching arguments with new counsel, Arizona preempted California’s
perfected appropriation with congressional apportionment through the
Boulder Canyon Project Act of 1922.95
Like Arizona’s need to challenge California’s perfected prior ap-
propriation, South Carolina may have been forced to act to prevent
North Carolina from establishing a prescriptive right to the Catawba-
Wateree River water, through the IBTs. The North Carolina Environmen-
tal Commission approved multiple transfers over several years, and un-
less South Carolina acted, it might have lost the ability to enjoin future
89. See North Carolina Progress Report No. 11 at 2 n. 2, South Carolina v. North Caro-
lina, 130 S. Ct. 854 (2010) (No. 06-138), available at http://www.mto.com/sm/docs/
7070444_1.pdf.
90. Id.
91. Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589, 610 (1945).
92. See Opening Letter Brief of the State of South Carolina re Bifurcated Proceedings at
4, South Carolina v. North Carolina, 130 S. Ct. 854 (2010) (No. 06-138) [hereinafter Opening
Letter Brief], available at http://www.mto.com/sm/docs/11291753_1.pdf.
93. AUGUST, supra note 2, at 61. R
94. Id. at 76.
95. Id. at 75–77.
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diversions.96 However, with the change to a regulated riparian system
discussed in Part IV.B.2.d, it is not clear whether the prescription argu-
ment is relevant. But both Arizona and South Carolina made the prover-
bial charge out of the gates in filing the suits, and underestimated the
magnitude, ramifications, and possible outcomes of a parens patriae suit.
Both cases are also nationally precedent-setting. Wilmer’s novel
argument extended the statutory construction aspect of Arizona’s case,
creating a new strategy in interstate water dispute allocation.97 In South
Carolina v. North Carolina, both the Special Master—by formulating a
more expansive intervenor test—and the Court itself—by utilizing the
existing test but applying it in a novel manner—extended intervenor sta-
tus to nonsovereign parties in an interstate apportionment, which has
never otherwise occurred. And even though a settlement agreement in a
parens patriae case is not novel,98 the elements of this one create a model
for other interstate water bodies in terms of achieving a science- and pro-
cess-based approach to responsible current and future resource
stewardship.99
But in each case, several justices objected to the precedent-setting
expansion of federal and individual powers. In both cases, the dissent
perceived a dilution of states’ sovereign powers; whether to the federal
government with increased allocation authority over western water
projects in Arizona v. California, or to the individuals who could avoid
state representation through parens patriae, and intervene on their own
behalf, in South Carolina v. North Carolina. In fact, the dissent vehemently
opposed the holding on intervention in South Carolina v. North Carolina,
arguing that it opened the proverbial flood gates to class actions in parens
96. Prescription is another name for adverse possession of a riparian water right. Like
land and other forms of property, riparians can lose their rights through use of the water in
a manner that is “open and notorious, hostile, exclusive, actual, and continuous . . . for a
prescribed number of years.” DAVID H. GETCHES, WATER LAW IN A NUTSHELL 72 (2009). The
ability to prescribe on a riparian system depends on location and the nature of the entity
conducting the prescription, as well as the extent of reasonable use and interference with
downstream use. Id.
97. Clyde, supra note 35, at 309 (stating “[a]s far as this writer knows, there has never R
before been a legislative apportionment of an interstate stream. The two methods which
were both well-known and much used were a division agreed to by the states through the
making of an interstate compact, and an equitable apportionment by the United States
Supreme Court.”).
98. Telephonic Conference Nov. 22, 2010, supra note 71, at 19–22 (citing to the two R
other original actions resolved through settlement, which are Vermont v. New York, 417
U.S. 270 (1974) and Georgia v. South Carolina, 536 U.S. 979 (2002)).
99. See Settlement Agreement, supra note 10; see also COMPREHENSIVE RELICENSING R
AGREEMENT, supra note 50. R
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patriae suits. Justices Roberts, Scalia, Ginsberg, and Sotomayor dissented
on the grounds that
this Court has never before granted intervention in such a case
to an entity other than a State, the United States, or an Indian
tribe. Never. That is because the apportionment of an inter-
state waterway is a sovereign dispute, and the key to interven-
tion in such an action is just that—sovereignty. The Court’s
decision to permit nonsovereigns to intervene in this case has
the potential to alter in a fundamental way the nature of our
original jurisdiction, transforming it from a means of resolving
high disputes between sovereigns into a forum for airing pri-
vate interests.100
Written by Chief Justice Roberts, the dissent argued that the majority
misapplied the test from New Jersey v. New York101 and violated two prin-
ciples of original jurisdiction. First, original jurisdiction is reserved for
states conflicts alone, and is unavailable to private claims. Second, the
Court’s original jurisdiction is “not well suited to assume the role of a
trial judge.”102 And as a result, nonsovereigns have not been permitted in
previous equitable apportionment suits. “The reason is straightforward:
An interest in water is an interest shared with other citizens, and is prop-
erly pressed or defended by the State.”103 Despite the dissent’s reasoning,
there is a new nonsovereign intervenor precedent in equitable apportion-
ment disputes.
And after Arizona v. California, “the national government emerged
with new powers over western water resources, but not without objec-
tion from three of the eight Justices who sat.”104 Justice Harlan dissented
in part, and was joined by Justices Douglas and Stewart. However, Jus-
tice Douglas also wrote a separate dissenting opinion. All three justices
agreed that the majority of the Court put too much weight on the Boul-
der Canyon Project Act, and consequently misinterpreted/overextended
the authority of the Secretary of the Interior in allocating the Colorado
River below the dam. Justice Harlan argued that “[section] 4(a) [of the
Project Act], on which the Court so heavily relies, neither apportions the
100. South Carolina v. North Carolina, 130 S. Ct. 854, 869 (overruling in part and sus-
taining in part South Carolina’s exceptions to the Special Master’s report on the intervenor
status of non-state entities) (Roberts, C.J., joined by Thomas, J., Ginsberg, J., & Sotomayor,
J., concurring in part, dissenting in part), and complaint dismissed, 131 S. Ct. 855 (2010)
(mem.), and 131 S. Ct. 975 (2011) (mem.) (discharging the Special Master).
101. New Jersey v. New York, 345 U.S. 369 (1953).
102. South Carolina v. North Carolina, 130 S. Ct. at 869.
103. Id. at 870.
104. Trelease, supra note 87, at 159. R
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waters of the river nor vests power in any official to make such an appor-
tionment.”105 Instead, it merely allocated a volume of water to each basin,
and did not interfere with states’ authority to distribute water according
to priorities. The legislative history illustrates the resistance of western
legislators to extend authority to the federal government in water alloca-
tion, and
when Congress ultimately resigned itself to the necessity of
legislating in some way with respect to the division of Lower
Basin waters, it used narrow words suitable to its narrow pur-
pose and to its regard both for the system of judicial appor-
tionment and appropriation and for the rights of the States.
Even then Congress did not attempt to legislate an apportion-
ment of Lower Basin water; it simply prescribed a ceiling for
California.106
Justice Douglas, while joining in Justice Harlan’s dissent, challenged the
Court’s interpretation of congressional intent and power with respect to
the Secretary of the Interior’s authority:
The question is not what Congress has the authority to do, but
rather the kind of regime under which Congress has built this
and other irrigation systems in the West. . . . The present
case . . . will, I think, be marked as the baldest attempt by
judges in modern times to spin their own philosophy into the
fabric of the law, in derogation of the will of the legislature.107
B. Differences
These similarities are exceeded by the factual and legal differences
between the positions of the plaintiffs and defendants. Although starting
from similar positions, it is important to note the nuances that contrib-
uted to the divergence, particularly in charting legal strategy in future
parens patriae suits.
1. Factual Differences
In terms of physical growth, Arizona was superseding that which
has been experienced in South Carolina, causing Arizona’s reliance on
water to rapidly increase. As its cities grew, Arizona suffered subsidence
from groundwater overdraft. South Carolina’s growth is comparatively
minimal in the Catawba-Wateree basin.
105. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 606 (1963).
106. Id. at 613.
107. Id. at 628.
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Also, the cost of moving water under the prior appropriative sys-
tem in California and Arizona is absent from the development contro-
versy that occurred in North Carolina and South Carolina. Instead, it’s
the pure growth rate itself; the City of Charlotte has exceeded the Ca-
tawba River basin (e.g., the Charlotte suburbs of Concord and Kan-
napolis, which are in another basin but fueled by the Charlotte growth
engine), while South Carolina’s cities on the Wateree have not. But South
Carolina sought to reserve the possibility of additional growth in these
downstream communities, which cannot occur without reliable water
availability.108
Unlike the relationship between South Carolina and North Caro-
lina, there had been a long, protracted, legal and political fight occurring
between Arizona and California before Arizona actually filed suit in
1952.109
Since the states of the lower basin were never able to agree
on . . . an intrabasin allocation, Arizona took to the courts.
First, she tried to enjoin the construction of Boulder Dam, then
to perpetuate the testimony of the negotiators of the Compact.
Next, she sought a judicial apportionment of the river, in the
absence of the United States as a party. In all these suits, she
was unsuccessful. All other roads blocked, Arizona finally rat-
ified the Compact in 1944. In 1952 she brought the present suit
against California.110
Inviting the inception of Arizona v. California, Congress could not find
proof that Arizona would have enough water to warrant the construc-
tion of the Central Arizona Project, which was being precluded by Cali-
fornia’s use. Both legally and politically, Arizona was systematically
being defeated by California. Although South Carolina objected as a
downstream user affected by a proposed IBT, there is no similar history
of a multidecade fight between the two states over water.111
108. Opening Letter Brief, supra note 92, at 10. R
109. HUNDLEY, supra note 2, at 304; REISNER, supra note 3, at 259–61; SAX ET AL., supra R
note 18, at 806 (tracking the negotiations in the Boulder Canyon Project Act, after which, R
“in 1930 Arizona decided, in the first of four original jurisdiction suits it was to bring
against California, to seek relief in the United States Supreme Court. For years, the Court
declined to decide the case because, without an active project to bring Colorado River
water to central Arizona, it had no controversy ripe for judicial solution.”).
110. Trelease, supra note 87, at 162 (discussing Arizona v. California, 283 U.S. 423 (1931), R
Arizona v. California, 292 U.S. 341 (1934), and Arizona v. California, 298 U.S. 558 (1936)).
111. In fact, it was quite amicable, as is evidenced by communications between the state
water management agencies over the contested IBT prior to litigation, and by the coopera-
tion in creating the river basin advisory commissions. Danny Johnson, South Carolina’s
Department of Health and Environmental Control, wrote via e-mail, to Thomas C. Fransen,
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The dam ownership is another significant difference, both factu-
ally and legally. The Colorado River’s dams are federally constructed
and controlled, while Duke Energy built and controls the dams on the
Catawba-Wateree. As a result, South Carolina could not utilize Wilmer’s
legal strategy.112 Had the Army Corps built the Catawba-Wateree dams,
arguably there would have been grounds for invoking federal control.
And while the dams are multipurpose on the Colorado,113 the primary
purpose of the dams on the Catawba-Wateree is for energy generation.114
From a public perspective, there is no figure in South Carolina v. North
Carolina who stands out in the case—unlike Wilmer in Arizona v.
California.
Additionally, the Arizona v. California case—like other parens pa-
triae suits—was extremely long in duration, while South Carolina v. North
Carolina settled three years and six months after the motion to file a com-
plaint was filed in June 2007. Arizona v. California was filed in 1952, and
the ultimate holding was made in 1963. South Carolina v. North Carolina
was anticipating a similar duration before the settlement, as North Caro-
lina estimated that without bifurcation, the discovery process would take
head of the River Basin Management Section of North Carolina’s Division of Water Re-
sources in the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, that the transfer was
not of a significant size and that South Carolina would benefit from it in the Yadkin-Pee
Dee River basin. Noted in Defendant State of North Carolina’s Brief in Support of Contin-
ued Bifurcation of the Litigation at 15, South Carolina v. North Carolina, 130 S. Ct. 854
(2010) (No. 06-138). In the e-mail, which preceded the litigation, Johnson stated, “I’ve re-
discussed the matter with Bud [Dr. A.W. “Bud” Badr] and our Division Director, and the
consensus opinion is that the transfer is not large enough to be of concern to us. Besides, we
get it back in the [Yadkin-]Pee Dee [River] where we may need it more anyway.” Quoted in
id. (corrections in original). While the 1997–2002 drought affected both states, they gener-
ally negotiated with each other over water supplies in both the Catawba-Wateree and the
Yadkin-Pee Dee River basins, particularly since the river systems’ flows are ultimately reg-
ulated by power-generating dams.
112. Meaning that because the federal government built the dams, they assume control
over the distribution of stored water, through the navigational servitude. See Wilmer, supra
note 23. R
113. The congressionally approved multipurpose uses include hydroelectric power
generation, flood control, and consumptive uses, including municipal, industrial, and agri-
culture. See Boulder Canyon Project Act of 1928, 43 U.S.C. § 617–617v (2011).
114. The Catawba-Wateree River dams generate energy through hydroelectric, coal-
fired and nuclear power plants that use cooling water. See Lake Wylie, DUKE ENERGY,
http://www.duke-energy.com/lakes/facts-and-maps/lake-wylie.asp (last visited Apr. 25,
2011) (describing power generation on Lake Wylie); Lake Wateree, DUKE ENERGY,
http://www.duke-energy.com/lakes/facts-and-maps/lake-wateree.asp (last visited Apr.
25, 2011) (describing power generation on Lake Wateree).
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years.115 This was, in part, because the states could not agree upon the
legal standard and procedural structure that should be associated with
equitable apportionment cases, and exchanged numerous briefs in a tac-
tic to buy time before trial.116 In fact, California engaged in the same
strategy, snowing Arizona at the beginning of the suit with copious mo-
tions to prolong delay.117 Such protracted cases exact a toll on all parties,
as well as the Special Master.118
2. Legal Differences
Although the cases started out somewhat similarly, there are also
considerable procedural and substantive differences that emerged
throughout their duration. Procedurally, they differ in the fact that Ari-
zona filed three other original jurisdiction suits against California before
the U.S. Supreme Court accepted Arizona v. California, while South Caro-
lina was granted certiorari on its first filing. Additionally, their motions
for intervention and the structure of the lawsuits themselves (e.g., to bi-
furcate or not, phased discovery, etc.) are procedurally different. Perhaps
115. Defendant State of North Carolina’s Reply Brief in Support of Continued Bifurca-
tion at 2, South Carolina v. North Carolina, 130 S. Ct. 854 (2010) (No. 06-138), available at
http://www.mto.com/sm/docs/10395853.pdf.
116. Within a year of filing the initial motion, the states agreed upon a bifurcated case
structure with phased discovery, in which South Carolina would show and possibly meet
the harm threshold for serious real or imminent injury from actions caused by North Caro-
lina, after which the water system would be allocated through balancing of the interests.
See Brief of the State of South Carolina Concerning Phase One and Phase Two Issues and
Timing, South Carolina v. North Carolina, 130 S. Ct. 854(2010) (No. 06-138), available at
http://www.mto.com/sm/docs/5329023_1.pdf. Despite submitting a joint case-manage-
ment plan that was finalized by the Special Master on Jan. 7, 2009, the states could not
agree on the issues for resolution in Phase I and II, with North Carolina seeking specificity
of the harm and adding subsidiary issues in Phase I. See South Carolina’s Eleventh Pro-
gress Report, South Carolina v. North Carolina, 130 S. Ct. 854 (2010) (No. 06-138), available
at http://www.mto.com/sm/docs/7070826_1.pdf; North Carolina Progress Report No. 11,
supra note 89. Seven days after the U.S. Supreme Court granted intervenor status to Duke R
Energy and the CRWSP, South Carolina changed tactics and sought to consolidate the bi-
furcation of the case into a single proceeding. See Opening Brief of the State of South Caro-
lina Favoring a Single Proceeding and Opposing Bifurcation of Discovery and Trial, South
Carolina v. North Carolina, 130 S. Ct. 854 (2010) (No. 06-138), available at http://www.mto.
com/sm/docs/10203010_1.pdf.
117. AUGUST, supra note 2, at 63 (stating that in response to Arizona’s initial filing, “Cal- R
ifornia attorneys commenced a campaign of judicial delay. A blizzard of motions and fil-
ings postponed the start of the proceedings, while the number and complexity of the issues
raised prompted the Court to appoint a special master to hear arguments.”).
118. The first Special Master, George I. Haight, died two years into the proceedings. His
replacement, Special Master Simon H. Rifkind, suffered a stress-induced heart attack two
years after being appointed to the position. AUGUST, supra note 2, at 63, 67. See also REISNER, R
supra note 3, at 261 (discussing the fact that Rifkind was only in his early fifties). R
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the ultimate procedural difference is that South Carolina and North Car-
olina reached a settlement agreement, rather than obtaining a U.S. Su-
preme Court ruling that favored one sovereign over another.
Substantively, they differ in the legal standard on which water
apportionment turns (i.e., an equitable apportionment remedy, rather
than one based on statutory allocation), and the issues associated with
different water rights systems, both between and across the respective
disputes. These differences are examined in more detail below.
a. Equitable Versus Statutory Allocation
In an equitable apportionment suit, the plaintiff (generally) must
clearly show the harm from actions of another (often upstream) state,119
after which the burden shifts to the other state to compare harms and
benefits from existing uses, and the Court determines how to equitably
apportion the waters.120 Throughout most of the briefing and in the origi-
nal complaint, South Carolina applied this standard, arguing that the
harm from North Carolina’s IBT and cumulative upstream uses injured
South Carolina’s downstream uses during times of drought. And yet,
South Carolina failed to note that the dam releases, which significantly
affect downstream flow levels, are governed largely by a nonsovereign
party, Duke Energy.121 In contrast, when Arizona started out with a simi-
lar equitable strategy, its harm was in sheer volume leaving the system
at all times of the year, caused by another sovereign party. And with
apportionment under a prior appropriative system, the rule of priority is
the general rule—with exceptions. This created a significant problem for
Arizona.122 But the question of priority is not likely to be at issue in a
regulated riparian system, which became the primary water law struc-
ture in both South Carolina and North Carolina.
Once new counsel stepped in, Arizona no longer had to fight the
water rights priority battle or seek equitable apportionment, diverging
entirely from South Carolina’s argument. Instead, it used a statutory
construction approach, shifting the case to congressional apportionment
under the Law of the River, which was interpreted to apportion 2.8 mil-
119. The elements to show injury are further enumerated later in Part IV.B.2.a.
120. Douglas L. Grant, Part VIII: Interstate Water Allocation, in WATERS AND WATER
RIGHTS §§ 45.05–45.06, at 43-1 (Robert E. Beck & Amy K. Kelly eds., 2009).
121. Transcript of Oral Argument before the U.S. Supreme Court, supra note 67, at 49 R
(“Mr. Browning: ‘Okay, with respect to Duke Energy: Duke is—has 11 dams in North and
South Carolina. As a result of those dams, Duke Energy controls the flow of the river into
South Carolina.’”).
122. See Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589, 608 (1945) (citing Arizona v. California,
298 U.S. 558 (1936)).
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lion acre-feet per year to Arizona.123 Arizona could then show harm from
its withholding. Saved by the Boulder Canyon Project Act, this argument
engendered a “shift from a case based on equity to a case based on statu-
tory apportionment.”124
But South Carolina could not invoke the same theory. The state
asked for equitable apportionment, instead of showing harm from viola-
tion of statutory apportionment. The applicability of the Arizona post-
Wilmer strategy was curtailed by the fact that the Catawba-Wateree
River has no compact, which would otherwise have extended authority
and allocation assurance similar to the congressional statutory allocation
on the Colorado River. Consequently, before settlement, South Carolina
was caught in a quagmire analogous to the one in which Arizona found
itself at the start of the litigation; a desire for equity, supported by broad
and unfocused pleadings for equitable apportionment.
As previously mentioned, South Carolina and North Carolina dis-
agreed on the specificity of the showing of harm for the proposed Phase I
of the originally bifurcated proceedings. North Carolina stated that
before further discovery “South Carolina has the obligation to provide a
Statement of Particularized Harm,” including specific identification of in-
jury and the uses causing it.125 In response, South Carolina disagreed
“that this Court’s cases articulate such a standard” and argued that it
was “unnecessary for the Special Master to resolve this issue at this
time.”126 Special Master Myles reversed the bifurcation and opted for a
single trial in which South Carolina had to show more harm than the fact
that “present or future diversions by North Carolina had resulted, or
would result, in less water than is needed for South Carolina’s present
uses.”127
To seek equitable apportionment, South Carolina had to prove to
the Court, which prefers not to mediate interstate disputes, that there
was a threatened invasion of rights sufficiently serious in magnitude.128
The Court utilizes the Connecticut v. Massachusetts129 standard: “The
governing rule is that this Court will not exert its extraordinary power to
control the conduct of one State at the suit of another, unless the
threatened invasion of rights is of serious magnitude and established by
clear and convincing evidence.”130 Generally, the threatened injury ap-
123. Trelease, supra note 87, at 166. R
124. AUGUST, supra note 2, at 83. R
125. North Carolina Progress Report No. 11, supra note 89, at 2 n.1. R
126. South Carolina Progress Report No. 11, supra note 116, at 3. R
127. Order Regarding Structure of Trial and Discovery, supra note 69, at 4. R
128. Grant, supra note 120, at 45-31. R
129. Connecticut v. Massachusetts, 282 U.S. 660 (1931).
130. Id. at 669.
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plies to already appropriated water, although the holding—to which
South Carolina cited131—in Idaho ex rel. Evans v. Oregon132 suggests that
unused waters may be subject to the remedy. However, even though it
was an equitable apportionment suit to divide water that was unused by
one of the entities with established title, that case is distinguished be-
cause it turned on anadramous fish, rather than the water itself.133 So the
question of whether threatened injury applies to unused water (reserved
for future uses) remains open.
In addition to the threatened injury itself, the plaintiff must show
that it is “of serious magnitude,” which is interpreted to mean that it can
be quantified and is substantial.134 It must also be “established by clear
and convincing evidence,” in contrast to the lower standard of prepon-
derance of the evidence.135 Without access to the discovery process, the
South Carolina bill of complaint did not appear to meet the full magni-
tude prong.136 This is because South Carolina’s existing uses were af-
fected only during times of drought and, by its own admission, the
Catawba-Wateree system was otherwise water-rich. To combat this argu-
ment, in her “Opening Letter Brief” on July 30, 2010, South Carolina fur-
ther refined its pleadings, using excerpts from the first set of contention
interrogatories as exhibits.137
Relying heavily on the Court’s previous holdings in New Jersey v.
New York138 and Nebraska v. Wyoming,139 South Carolina argued that the
harm during drought is of serious magnitude because “the Court has
made clear that select harms suffered only at certain times of the year
will suffice to satisfy the downstream State’s threshold burden to prove
injury from consumption in the upstream State, and therefore warrant an
equitable apportionment.”140 It continued to argue that drought levels
131. Motion, Complaint & Brief in Support, supra note 6, Brief at 11–12, 13 n.8. R
132. Idaho ex rel. Evans v. Oregon, 462 U.S. 1017 (1983); accord Grant, supra note 120, at R
45-32.
133. Grant, supra note 120, at 45-32. R
134. Id. at 45-32 to 45-33.
135. Clear and convincing proof is “that proof which results in reasonable certainty of
the truth of the ultimate fact in controversy. Proof which requires more than a preponder-
ance of the evidence but less than proof beyond a reasonable doubt.” BLACK’S LAW DICTION-
ARY 172 (6th ed. 1991).
136. Brief of the State of North Carolina in Opposition on Motion for Leave to File Bill
of Complaint, supra note 58, at 10, 18–20. R
137. Opening Letter Brief, supra note 92, at Ex. A, B. (The First Set of Contention Inter- R
rogatories, dated Feb. 23, 2010, are not available on the Special Master’s docket sheet at
http://www.mto.com/sm.).
138. New Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S. 336 (1931).
139. Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589 (1945).
140. Opening Letter Brief, supra note 92, at 5. R
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should be the baseline standard from which to determine the apportion-
ment, and that North Carolina was not legally justified in asserting a
tortious standard of proximate causation in the injury showing. And yet,
it is not clear in the pleadings whether the harms are actually caused by
drought, the upstream uses, or a combination of both. Isolating the
causal factors would have bolstered South Carolina’s harm argument.
In the July 30, 2010, brief, South Carolina also tried to show the
magnitude of the injury to reach the “clear and convincing evidence”
standard for both existing and future uses. But it used speculative lan-
guage like “might have had to curtail production,”141 “would have had to
de-rate,”142 and “can adversely affect the quality of recreational out-
ings”143 for the existing uses, suggesting that the harm was not as severe
as it seemed. Additionally, South Carolina identified harms to recrea-
tional uses on lakes, including boat ramp closures and associated repair
costs. But the same occurred during drought on lakes on the Savannah
River as well. Lake Hartwell was particularly affected in order to main-
tain water levels on Lake Keowee, the upstream lake with a nuclear
power plant, and for downstream users (e.g., cities and another nuclear
power plant).144 South Carolina has a significant IBT on Lake Keowee,
which is located in the headwaters of the Savannah, and is therefore po-
tentially subject to the same arguments it presented against North
Carolina.145
Even if South Carolina could have shown that North Carolina’s
IBTs and cumulative uses were the primary cause of the harm, it also
neglected the fact that North Carolina’s injurious IBT was primarily for
municipal and domestic use. Despite being riparian, there is a general
hierarchy in the purpose of use in some states when examining the rea-
sonableness of the use (i.e., domestic over economic).146 South Carolina’s
harms occurred during low flows to “industrial and commercial users,
water-based recreational users and businesses, and water utilities.”147
The harm to the water utilities was revenue-based, as people learned to
141. Id. at Ex. B at 9.
142. Id. at Ex. B at 11.
143. Id. at Ex. B at 13–14.
144. JEFFERY S. ALLEN, ROBERT T. CAREY, LORI A. DICKES, ELLEN W. SALTZMAN & COREY
N. ALLEN, U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS, AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LOW WATER LEVELS
IN HARWELL LAKE (2010), available at http://www.sas.usace.army.mil/Lake%20Hartwell%
20FINAL%2011-9-10.pdf (last visited Jan. 17, 2011).
145. South Carolina also has an IBT on the Catawba-Wateree in Lancaster County,
South Carolina. See Transcript of Oral Argument before the U.S. Supreme Court, supra note
67, at 55–56. R
146. GETCHES, supra note 96, at 50, 60. R
147. Opening Letter Brief, supra note 92, at 7. R
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conserve water and reduced their use, which happened throughout the
southeastern states under drought conditions. The drought also affected
the utilities’ water quality, but again, this was experienced throughout
the state of South Carolina on various river systems.
In addition to the lack of clarity as to the causation of the harm,
South Carolina’s pleadings were also opaque in whether it sought equi-
table apportionment of the water itself, or of the benefits from the water
flow of the Catawba-Wateree River. The Court’s January 20, 2010, hold-
ing stated that South Carolina requested an equitable apportionment for
the Catawba-Wateree River’s waters.148 This suggests that either the
Court, South Carolina, or both, did not follow the congressional defini-
tion of equitable apportionment, which “does not mean literally a divi-
sion of the waters; in its pristine form it meant ‘the equitable
apportionment of benefits . . . resulting from the flow of the river.’”149
North Carolina mentioned this fact in its briefing, arguing that should
South Carolina have met the threshold injury standard, it would have
had to consider the benefits that accrue to each state from the use of the
water in the Catawba-Wateree and the Yadkin-Pee Dee rivers.150
For instance, if an IBT transfers water from the Catawba River ba-
sin, it is used in the Yadkin-Pee Dee River basin and returned to that
system, which brings benefit to South Carolina.151 In fact, South Carolina
needs water most in this system, given the seasonal shortages and associ-
ated water quality problems in South Carolina’s north coast cities (see
discussion in Part V and note 217). North Carolina merely adhered to the
traditional congressional definition of “equitable apportionment” that ex-
amines benefits such as shared electric power, water utilized in each
state by commuters from the other state, and value that the IBT creates
for South Carolina, as well as costs to each state.152 The subtle difference
in the meaning of equitable apportionment was a source of contention
and could have produced an outcome that South Carolina did not antici-
pate when it filed the bill of complaint.
148. South Carolina v. North Carolina, 130 S. Ct. 854 (overruling in part and sustaining
in part South Carolina’s exceptions to the Special Master’s report on the intervenor status
of non-state entities), and complaint dismissed, 131 S. Ct. 855 (2010) (mem.), and 131 S. Ct. 975
(2011) (mem.) (discharging the Special Master).
149. Trelease, supra note 87, at 183 (quoting Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46 (1907)). R
150. Opening Letter Brief, supra note 92, at 3 (stating that “North Carolina erroneously R
contends that an equitable apportionment should consider whether its interbasin transfers
bring benefits to South Carolina citizens in adjacent river basins.”).
151. North Carolina’s Brief in Support of Continued Bifurcation of the Litigation, supra
note 111, at 15 (quoting e-mail communication between Danny Johnson and Thomas C. R
Fransen).
152. See North Carolina Letter Brief Advocating Bifurcated Discovery at 5–6, South Car-
olina v. North Carolina, 130 S. Ct. 854.
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b. Wavering on Bifurcation
As previously mentioned, South Carolina v. North Carolina was ini-
tially bifurcated in its case management plan, with phased discovery.153
However, South Carolina later argued that a “single discovery period”
and not bifurcating the case made sense for the following reasons: (1) to
promote judicial economy, eliminating the need for two sets of testimony
from the same set of witnesses and experts; (2) to “facilitate early settle-
ment” without prejudice to any party or intervenor; (3) to address the
disagreement on the legal standard for the showing of harm in an equita-
ble apportionment suit; and, (4) to reach the contentious issue of includ-
ing benefits that South Carolina receives in other river basins from the
Catawba-Wateree River IBT in North Carolina.154 Both North Carolina
and the intervenors, Duke Energy and CRWSP, advocated for the contin-
ued bifurcation. In telephonic conferences after South Carolina’s request
to reverse the bifurcation order, Special Master Myles indicated an intent
to consider one consolidated trial, with a summary judgment phase at
the beginning. That would have avoided “the potential for overlap be-
tween Phase I and Phase II discovery,” which was repeatedly raised in
South Carolina’s briefs.155 Consequently, the issue became whether to
have “either or both of (1) phased discovery; or (2) a clearly delineated
summary judgment phase that would include the threshold question of
injury.”156
After this communication, the Special Master then proposed a
new procedural structure in the August 20, 2010, telephonic conference
with the counsel for the parties. She discussed the fact that each state had
a different view of the entitlement needed for a remedy, with South Car-
olina perceiving it to be light, and North Carolina arguing that it is
broader and more substantial. She agreed with
North Carolina’s view in the sense that . . . if the question is
solely when is the complaining state entitled to a decree, then I
think there is a broader ranging inquiry that leads up to that
conclusion.
One doesn’t just show injury in the abstract or as South
Carolina’s defined it and then proceed directly to the appor-
153. Case Management Order No. 9 Regarding Case Management Plan at 4, South Car-
olina v. North Carolina, 130 S. Ct. 854 (2010) (No. 06-138), available at http://www.mto.
com/sm/docs/6724979_1.pdf.
154. Opening Letter Brief, supra note 92, at 2–4. R
155. North Carolina Letter Brief, supra note 152, at 4. R
156. Opening Letter Brief, supra note 92, at 1 (quoting an e-mail from Special Master R
Myles to Counsel for the Parties (July 22, 2010)).
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tionment phase. One has to show an entitlement to apportion-
ment that is broader ranging than that.157
Special Master Myles was concerned about the concreteness of injury
(i.e., existing versus future uses and harms), and the concept of causa-
tion.158 Consequently, she proposed a “trial on the question of entitle-
ment to a remedy,” which would “include any and all issues that either
party thinks are relevant” (e.g., causation, and a summary judgment
phase).159 After this phase, there could be a second trial that “shaped the
decree.”160 This would have resolved the states’ dispute over the burden
of proof, and “the beauty of this approach . . . may be that it minimizes
disputes over trying to define issues in phases that will or won’t be in-
cluded . . . . It allows people to proceed somewhat at their peril.”161 In
an order issued on Nov. 17, 2010, she solidified this single, broader pro-
ceeding to gauge liability and improve efficiency.162
c. Intervenors
The suits also differed significantly in their approach to interven-
tion, and the associated implications for parens patriae jurisprudence. Ari-
zona named Colorado River water users in California, in addition to the
State itself, when it filed the bill of complaint for the parens patriae law-
suit in 1952. This suggests that Arizona was cognizant of the users and
individual interests that would be affected—and which might be distin-
guished from the State’s interests—to avoid intervention. After being
named, California began encouraging intervention by approaching the
Upper Basin states, suggesting that they join the lawsuit. However, most
were reluctant to do so, and Arizona was able to exclude the majority,
because the Colorado River Compact of 1922 separated the river into two
basins. Consequently, only the State of Nevada intervened, along with
the United States, which was primarily representing Native American
tribal interests. New Mexico and Utah were impleaded because parts of
the lower basin are located in their states.
Compared to California’s active role in seeking intervention from
other Colorado River states, North Carolina was relatively indifferent to
the intervention efforts of the intervenors (both successful and unsuc-
157. Telephonic Conference Before Special Master Kristin Linsley Myles at 8, South
Carolina v. North Carolina, 130 S. Ct. 854 (2010) (No. 06-138), available at http://www.mto.
com/sm/docs/CONF0820.pdf.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 11–12.
160. Id. at 12.
161. Id. at 39–40.
162. Order Regarding Structure of Trial and Discovery, supra note 69, at 2. R
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cessful).163 In contrast, in its original bill of complaint, South Carolina did
not name Duke Energy, Catawba River Water Supply, and the City of
Charlotte as defendants, and opposed their intervention as nonsovereign
parties in a parens patriae suit when the Special Master admitted them. To
do so, Special Master Myles culled from original actions more generally,
where nonsovereign entities were permitted to enter the suit as parties.
She also promulgated the following rule for intervenors in her First In-
terim Report:
Although the Court’s original jurisdiction presumptively is re-
served for disputes between sovereign states over sovereign
matters, non-state entities may become parties to such original
disputes in appropriate and compelling circumstances, such as
where the non-state entity is the instrumentality authorized to
carry out the wrongful conduct or injury for which the com-
plaining states seeks relief . . . .164
However, the Court declined to follow her new standard, saying that,
“the Special Master crafted a rule of intervention that accounts for the
full compass of our precedents.”165 Instead, the Court applied the New
Jersey v. New York166 standard, which says that “‘[a]n intervenor whose
state is already a party should have the burden of showing some compel-
ling interest in his own right, apart from his interest in a class with all
other citizens and creatures of the state . . . .’”167 And yet, in applying
the general rule, the Court extended the intervention standard in original
actions over interstate waters by allowing nonsovereign intervenors.
Comparatively, Arizona v. California involved only sovereign intervenors,
whether other states, the United States, or the Native American tribes
represented by the United States.
163. See Transcript of Oral Argument before the U.S. Supreme Court, supra note 67, at R
48 (Regarding North Carolina’s position on the intervenors, Chief Justice Roberts said to
North Carolina’s counsel, “You didn’t even want to be here. As they view the case and as
you view the case, it’s got so little to do with the State that the State didn’t even want to
come here and argue the case.” The Justices go on to question North Carolina about its
ability to represent the proposed intervenors’ interests, pressing North Carolina’s weak
statements about its inability to do so.).
164. First Interim Report of the Special Master, supra note 66, at 20–21. R
165. South Carolina v. North Carolina, 130 S. Ct. 854, 862 (2010).
166. New Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S. 336 (1931).
167. South Carolina v. North Carolina, 130 S. Ct. at 870 (quoting New Jersey v. New
York, 345 U.S. at 373).
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d. Water Rights Systems
Furthermore, there is a simple difference in the nature of the
water rights involved in each river system. Arizona and California were
appropriative and hybrid water rights systems, respectively.168 South
Carolina and North Carolina are regulated riparian systems (although
South Carolina was riparian at the start of the litigation). The common
property nature of the riparian doctrine, even under a regulated riparian
structure, means that in one respect South Carolina has a more substan-
tial and equal legal platform than Arizona with California’s perfected,
priority-based, appropriative rights. Theoretically, an upstream riparian
is not allowed to harm a downstream riparian,169 but that is changing
with more consumptive uses and IBTs on riparian systems.
One of the questions at issue was whether the respective water
laws of the states affect the standard of harm required under equitable
apportionment. North Carolina argued that it would, in that there is a
reasonableness standard for riparians, which means that actual volumes
are not defined, and it can be harder to reach the burden of proof for
equitable apportionment.170 South Carolina argued that it would not, and
that they would have to show enough to meet a prior appropriative stan-
dard, which the Special Master refuted.171
Although both states now use a form of regulated riparianism,
definitions and applicability of the concept vary by state. Under a gen-
eral regulated riparian system, water withdrawal requires a permit from
the state at the location where the withdrawal occurs, similar to prior
appropriation.172 So water rights are no longer determined by land own-
ership, but are still subject to the reasonableness doctrine—for social pol-
icy and for potential effect on other permitted uses.173
South Carolina passed its Water Withdrawal, Permitting, Use, and
Reporting Act (S. 452) on June 11, 2010, effective January 1, 2011.174 The
act introduced a regulated riparian system for withdrawals of over 3 mil-
lion gallons per month, which is a standard volume from the American
Society of Civil Engineers–regulated riparian model code.175 In addition,
states often adopt a set of minimum flow requirements to be used in
168. GETCHES, supra note 96, at 7–8, 84–85. R
169. See id. at 50–51.
170. Order Regarding Structure of Trial and Discovery, supra note 69, at 4–5. R
171. Id.
172. AM. SOC’Y OF CIVIL ENG’RS, REGULATED RIPARIAN MODEL WATER CODE, § 4R-1-06 at
46–47, § 6R-2-01 at 100–102 (2004).
173. See id. § 2R-1-01 at 14, § 6R-3-01 at 106–107, § 6R-3-02 at 108–110.
174. A former version of this bill, S. 428, was introduced in 2007–2008 but did not pass
through the legislature. See discussion, infra note 200. R
175. AM. SOC’Y OF CIVIL ENG’RS, supra note 172, § 6R-1-02 at 94–96. R
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conjunction with the permitting system. For instance, in Georgia, with-
drawers have three options: (1) maintain a monthly 7Q10 minimum
flow,176 (2) maintain minimum flows determined by a site-specific study,
or (3) maintain mean annual minimum flows.177 South Carolina’s defini-
tion of “minimum flows” is variable and seasonally based, and is deter-
mined by each stretch of a water system, with “forty percent of the mean
annual daily flow for the months of January, February, March, and April;
thirty percent . . . for the months of May, June, and December; and
twenty percent . . . for the months of July through November . . . .”178
In the event of drought, South Carolina can dip into these minimum
flows, as long as the users don’t permanently compromise the water
body. The permit duration is quite long, from 20–50 years to reflect “the
economic life of any capital investments made by the permittee neces-
sary to carry out the permittee’s use of the withdrawn water.”179
But that means that the reasonableness of use, which might have
changed over a 20-year period, may not be revisited until the permit ex-
pires. The statute contains a provision for determining reasonableness
when issuing a permit, enumerating several criteria.180 The permit appli-
cation must also contain an estimated ratio between water withdrawn
and the consumptive use of that water, which aids in assessing remain-
ing available water.181 Registered surface water withdrawers under the
older statute can continue withdrawing at their highest capacity, which
grandfathers-in existing over-allocations and maintains the disputed sta-
tus quo. Also, current IBTs are treated as existing surface water with-
drawers, and accordingly, any renewal goes through the same process.
But new IBTs that require permits must have a noticed public hearing.182
North Carolina’s system, while technically regulated riparian and
one of the first in the Southeast under the Water Use Act of 1967,183 is
limited to designated capacity use areas. The permitting requirement ap-
plies to both surface water and groundwater in these areas, which are
primarily in the state’s coastal plain. The remainder of the water is gov-
176. GA. COMP. R. & REGS. 391-3-6-.07(2)(j) (2010) (stating that “‘7Q10 Flow’ shall mean
that lowest average stream flow expected to occur for seven consecutive days with an aver-
age frequency of once in ten years.”).
177. GA. COMP. R. & REGS. 391-3-6-.07(4)(b)(9)(iii)(II) (2010) (instream flow protection
obligation); GA. DEP’T OF NATURAL RES., WATER ISSUES WHITE PAPER 28–29 (2001) (enumer-
ating the three instream flow assessment options which were adopted by the Georgia De-
partment of Natural Resources Board as interim instream flow policy).
178. S.C. CODE ANN. § 49-4-20(14) (2010).
179. S.C. CODE ANN. § 49-4-100(B) (2010).
180. S.C. CODE ANN. § 49-4-80(B) (2010).
181. S.C. CODE ANN. § 49-4-80(A)(5) (2010).
182. S.C. CODE ANN. § 49-4-90 (2010).
183. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-215.11 (2010).
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erned under riparian law, limiting place of use. In 2009, the North Caro-
lina Legislature introduced a Water Resource Policy Act of 2009 (SB 907)
that would have created a comprehensive water policy and introduced
regulated riparianism throughout the state, consolidated water-related
statutes, improved water supply planning through river-based organiza-
tions, and introduced hydrologic modeling for all of the state’s water
sources.184 However, the bill died in committee. But one aspect of SB 907,
river basin modeling, passed in the 2009–2010 legislative session as HB
1743.185
Both of these pieces of legislation are integral components of more
efficient interstate and intrastate water management, particularly with
mounting demand from population growth, more consumptive uses,
and IBTs, as well as more limited supply caused by repetitive and endur-
ing droughts in the Southeast. Instituting a regulated riparian system
creates a structure to manage an increasingly scarce resource. According
to Davis, the “troika of persistent drought, booming demand and inter-
state dispute has generated tremendous political horsepower.”186
The pressure created by interstate dispute propelled South Caro-
lina into drafting and introducing S. 428, the precursor to S. 452.187 Ar-
guably, given the interconnection of the two states, North Carolina
responded to South Carolina’s efforts and introduced its own legislation.
Both South Carolina and North Carolina are clearly trying to record and
quantify their usage, which is both a component of the remedy phase of
equitable apportionment, and a socially useful by-product of the lawsuit.
e. Outcomes
Finally, the largest difference between the two lawsuits lies in the
actual outcome. South Carolina v. North Carolina settled, while Arizona v.
California ended in a holding that on the surface appeared to benefit Ari-
zona, but was difficult to realize in actual acre-feet. The settlement itself,
while not precluding future parens patriae suits over shared water, lays
the groundwork for a cooperative relationship between the states and
the intervenors. It does so by relying on all of the following previous
agreements and/or current commitments, for the duration of the FERC
license.
184. Susan Stabley, Water Legislation Would Open Door To Sweeping Shift in N.C., CHAR-
LOTTE BUS. J., June 5, 2009, available at http://www.bizjournals.com/charlotte/stories/
2009/06/08/story3.html.
185. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 143-350 (2010), N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 143-355 (2010).
186. Davis, supra note 7, at 2. R
187. Id. at 45–46.
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First, each state agreed to regulate their use and water with-
drawal, sharing information between their resource agencies and con-
serving water during drought.188 The parties also rely heavily on the
Comprehensive Relicensing Agreement (CRA) itself, and the states
agreed to enforce withdrawal reductions during drought per the CRA’s
Low Inflow Protocol (LIP).189 This includes implementing drought re-
sponse plans for withdrawers that use the CRA’s LIP requirements as a
baseline for stringency. Within the CRA, the parties particularly sup-
ported the proposed license articles and the projected withdrawals and
returns in 2058, which are included in Appendix A and Appendix H of
the agreement, respectively.190
The states also agreed to a mutual updating process for the associ-
ated Catawba-Wateree River Basin Water Supply study on a decadal cy-
cle.191 And they will coordinate their state-level IBT approval policies and
processes, which includes using notice, the Environmental Impact State-
ment process from the National Environmental Policy Act,192 public re-
view, findings of fact, and annual reporting.193 Finally, the states agreed
to create a memorandum of agreement to guide permitting for bi-state
water providers.194 Even a later motion to file another parens patriae suit
requires additional negotiation for 90 days before (and to dissuade) an
actual filing, with the Bi-State Commission acting as the arbiter.195 These
attributes are novel, promoting voluntary interstate cooperation, while in
the Arizona v. California holding, the Court had to order Arizona to share
its entitlement with sovereign Native American tribes.196
From a procedural standpoint, in Arizona v. California, the Court
issued a holding, while the South Carolina v. North Carolina settlement
agreement corresponds to a Rule 46 dismissal of the proceedings.197 This
means that the Court did not examine the substance of the settlement
agreement, and did not issue an order that the parties can later enforce
against each other. Additionally, neither of the state legislatures had to
grant approval.198
188. Settlement Agreement, supra note 10. R
189. Id.
190. Id. at 3–4.
191. Id.
192. National Environmental Policy Act (1969, 1970), 42 U.S.C. § 4331 (1970).
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Settlement Agreement, supra note 10, at 3–4. R
196. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963).
197. SUP. CT. R. 46.
198. Telephonic Conference Nov. 22, 2010, supra note 71, at 17. R
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V. FROM ARIZONA TO SOUTH CAROLINA: LESSONS
While Arizona v. California ultimately “turned on the interpretation
of federal legislation, not on common law of equitable apportionment,”199
and South Carolina v. North Carolina reached a settlement, there are les-
sons from each case for future parens patriae suits to address interstate
water conflicts.
The first is that South Carolina’s original position might have
been stronger if it had proverbially “cleaned its own house” before en-
gaging in the litigation. At the start of the parens patriae suit, the South
Carolina Legislature had proposed a regulated riparian system, which
would have allocated water through a permitting system and protected
minimum environmental flows.200 Had South Carolina carefully ex-
amined its own uses, determined whether to permit surface water before
the drought, and adopted S. 428 or similar legislation protecting flows
(in addition to establishing the permitting system), the state might have
had more equal footing when it challenged North Carolina.
Having passed S. 452, South Carolina created protection for mini-
mum environmental flows.201 As a legal strategy different from Ari-
zona’s, South Carolina could have shown harm through interference
with these reasonable minimum flows, regardless of drought. Because
North Carolina challenged the actual harm to South Carolina based on
their description of events during drought, this strategy might have es-
tablished stronger grounds for proving harm. However, it is not clear if
this legislation would have applied retroactively; regardless, South Caro-
lina could have used the argument to show potential future harms.
199. GRANT, supra note 128, § 45.04(a), at 45-35. R
200. South Carolina’s Senate Bill 428, which was originally drafted in 2005, and intro-
duced to the Legislature by Senator Wes Hayes and Representative Carl Gullick in 2007,
was known as the “Surface Water Withdrawal, Permitting, Use and Reporting Act.” It did
not pass, and was instead tabled, as the South Carolina Department of Health and Environ-
mental Control’s Water Monitoring Division worked with the state’s Department of Natu-
ral Resources to revise the language, which eventually generated S. 452 (2010). The bills are
quite similar in content. The impetus for S. 428 came from a combination of factors, includ-
ing climate change and altered precipitation patterns that generated appreciable drought,
affecting both ground and surface water availability. Additionally, the nature of the state’s
water demand has shifted from non-consumptive to consumptive uses (a trend throughout
the country), coupled with sprawling growth high in the source watersheds (and a 30 per-
cent population increase projected by 2030). Finally, an appointed group, the Commission
to Review Water Rights, issued the Governor’s Water Law Report in 2004, and their find-
ings coincided with social realizations about water management, e.g., the need for permit-
ting surface water withdrawals, instituting a regulated riparian system, etc. For further
discussion of the impetus and nuances of S. 428, see J. Blanding Holman IV, The Advent of
Modified Riparianism in South Carolina, 16 SOUTHEASTERN ENVTL. L.J. 291 (2008).
201. S.C. CODE ANN. § 49-4-20(14) (2010).
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South Carolina’s new minimum flow levels might have directly con-
flicted with North Carolina’s IBT statute, pitting state legislation against
state legislation on the shared water body, and creating another factor
for which equitable apportionment must account.
In another form of “cleaning house,” South Carolina would
have—and might still202—benefit from a compact. Had one been in place,
as in Arizona, South Carolina could have invoked the federal allocation
of the river through congressional imprimatur, instead of relying on
riparianism and a plea for equitable apportionment. This begs the ques-
tion of whether both states actually exhausted their compacting efforts
and whether they had an obligation to do so.203 And it suggests that,
regionally, South Carolina would benefit from entering a compact with
Georgia over the Savannah River. “Equitable apportionment litigation
has been much criticized as a method of resolving interstate water con-
flicts. Foremost among the critics is the Supreme Court itself. The Court
has urged states to settle their water disputes by compact if possible.”204
Despite the critiques of the compact structure,205 they are actually prov-
202. As Special Master Myles clarified in the final telephonic conference on Nov. 22,
2010, the settlement is not equivalent to a compact, since neither state “enhanced their posi-
tion or power vis-a`-vis other states that were not parties with respect to an issue, or which
invade the province of the Federal Government.” Telephonic Conference Nov. 22, 2010,
supra note 71, at 31. Additionally, there was no congressional approval of the settlement R
terms.
203. Riddle, supra note 46 (quoting Dr. Moreau). R
204. GRANT, supra note 120, § 45.01, at 45-7 (citing Texas v. New Mexico, 462 U.S. 554, R
567 n.13 (1983) and Colorado v. Kansas, 320 U.S. 383, 392 (1943)). The Court prefers not to
take on these cases because of the vagueness of the standards associated with apportion-
ment; the need for continuing supervision and the Court’s lack of desire to play “referee”;
the mass of technical data and the Court’s lack of expertise with it; and finally, the expense
of the litigation and the cost of the Special Master. JOSEPH W. DELLAPENNA, THE LAW, INTER-
STATE COMPACTS, AND THE SOUTHEASTERN WATER COMPACT (Jeffrey L. Jordan & Aaron T.
Wolf eds., 2006). In addition to article I, § 10, clause 3 of the Constitution, that encourages
interstate compacts, “the Supreme Court has made its position abundantly clear: states
should resolve their conflicts among themselves.” GEORGE WILLIAM SHERK, DIVIDING THE
WATERS: THE RESOLUTION OF INTERSTATE WATER CONFLICTS IN THE UNITED STATES 29 (2000).
205. Most of the compacts are western, although some of the most enduring and suc-
cessful have occurred on eastern or midwestern water bodies. SHERK, supra note 204; DEL- R
LAPENNA, supra note 204. Invariably, most states will see conflict over interstate water at R
some point in time, as “[o]f the fifty states that comprise the United States of America, only
two—Alaska and Hawaii—do not share a ground or surface water resource with another
state. Accordingly, with regard to conflicts over interstate water resources, the forty-eight
contiguous states fall into one of two categories: those states that are (or have been) in-
volved in an interstate water conflict or those states that are going to be involved in an
interstate water conflict.” George William Sherk, Transboundary Water Allocation in the
Twenty-First Century: Colloquium Article: The Management of Interstate Water Conflicts in the
Twenty-First Century: Is It Time to Call Uncle? 12 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 764, 765 (2005). The
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ing to be adept in resolving distributional conflicts, even with unanimity
clauses.206 In fact, in contrast to the 26 water allocation compacts,207 seven
single-purpose pollution control compacts,208 12 planning and flood-con-
trol compacts,209 and three multipurpose regulatory compacts,210 there
are only eight equitably apportioned interstate rivers in the United
States, given the associated cost and time of the equitable apportionment
process.211
In thinking more broadly about the implications of Arizona v. Cali-
fornia for the Catawba dispute and other, future parens patriae suits over
disputed interstate waters, one must ask whether the outcome was the
right one in terms of water use for Arizona, and the West more gener-
ally. Arguably, the answer is “no.” After the suit, hydrologists realized
that the Colorado had been experiencing unusually wet years during the
time in which the river was allocated, and they now know that water
volumes are annually, on average, 1.5 million acre-feet lower than pro-
jected and accordingly allocated.212
Additionally, winning the lawsuit does not assure victory in the
battle. Arizona suffered in its construction of the water conveyance sys-
tem (the Central Arizona Project) thanks to California’s subsequent con-
gressional interference.213 Water shortage was a reality, regardless of the
legal holding. And the Native American intervenors ultimately benefited
the most, receiving a substantial portion of Arizona’s allocation. As
Reisner intimated, after discussing the legal issues in the case, “[t]he real
compacting process and the compacts themselves have been challenged and critiqued in
terms of their institutional structure, their rigidity over time, their omission of important
issues, and their potential to be ineffectual through unanimity clauses and later congres-
sional nullification (either entirely or partially). DELLAPENNA, supra note 204; Lynn A. R
Mandarano, Jeffrey P. Featherstone & Kurt Paulsen, Institutions for Interstate Water Resources
Management, 44 J. AM. WATER RESOURCES ASS’N 136 (2008). But recent research is showing
that compacting can be a viable tool to resolve interstate water conflicts, particularly in
terms of allocation, when the compact commissions are viable institutions and have broad
powers to carry out their mandates. See Mandarano, Featherstone, & Paulson, supra, at 136;
Edella Schlager & Tanya Heikkila, Resolving Water Conflicts: A Comparative Analysis of Inter-
state River Compacts, 37 POL’Y STUD. J. 367 (2009).
206. Schlager & Heikkila, supra note 205, at 385. R
207. SHERK, supra note 204, at 30 n.14. R
208. Id. at 31, n.15.
209. Id. at 32, n.23.
210. Id. at 35, n.50.
211. GRANT, supra note 120, § 45.01, at 45-2 to 45-3 (identifying the following equitably R
apportioned main stem rivers: Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Laramie, North
Platte, Vermejo, and Walla Walla).
212. Sue McClurg, How Is the Colorado River Shortage Agreement Working?, RIVER REPORT,
Fall 2008, at 6; SAX ET AL., supra note 18, at 811–13; REISNER, supra note 3, at 262–63. R
213. AUGUST, supra note 2, at 99–108; HUNDLEY, supra note 2, at 312. R
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issues had much more to do with nature and economics than with law,
and they were just beginning to make themselves felt.”214
Economic development did follow the water for Arizona after the
suit, and that was South Carolina’s ultimate objective when she filed her
bill of complaint. In the July 30, 2010, Opening Letter Brief regarding the
continuation of bifurcation, South Carolina argued that “a single pro-
ceeding consisting of a single discovery period and a single trial will be
the most effective and efficient means of bringing the certainty sought by
South Carolina citizens concerning their future water needs.”215 The focus
was clearly on future economic development, enabled by water supply.
According to Trelease, “[w]ith so much land, and so little water, the ma-
jor problem in the Colorado basin is which acres shall receive the
water.”216 While it is not quite analogous in the Catawba basin, with so
much population in Charlotte, North Carolina, and the desire for growth
in South Carolina, the same underlying issue exists. And yet, it is not
clear why South Carolina initiated suit instead of negotiating return flow
from the Catawba-Wateree IBT into the Yadkin-Pee Dee basin, where
South Carolina’s larger city, Myrtle Beach, needed it more.217
Having initiated the suit, South Carolina narrowly avoided setting
a precedent upon which Georgia could have capitalized on the Savannah
River (e.g., the cities of Augusta and Savannah, as well as the potential
for Atlanta’s straw in the system). South Carolina has a substantial IBT
from Lake Keowee on the Upper Savannah River and Georgia does not.
However, the City of Atlanta was recently legally cut off from its Lake
Lanier supply218 and is seeking alternate sources. Should South Carolina
214. See REISNER, supra note 3, at 259. R
215. Opening Letter Brief, supra note 92, at 7 (emphasis added). R
216. Trelease, supra note 87, at 160. R
217. North Carolina’s Brief in Support of Continued Bifurcation of the Litigation, supra
note 111, at 15 (quoting an e-mail regarding the need on the Yadkin-Pee Dee River). The R
problem on the Yadkin-Pee Dee River is sufficiently severe that Franck and Pompe recom-
mended that the FERC relicensing process for the dams on that system include a water
transfer framework. See David Francke & Jeffrey Pompe, Water Transfer Between North and
South Carolina: An Option for Policy Reform, 45 NAT. RESOURCES J. 441 (2005).
218. In a July 17, 2009, holding by a U.S. District Court judge in Florida on the ACT/
ACF dispute, the court limited Atlanta’s Lake Lanier water use to levels in the 1970s, effec-
tive in July 2012. The judge held that “[h]aving thoroughly reviewed the legislative history
and the record, the Court comes to the inescapable conclusion that water supply, at least in
the form of withdrawals from Lake Lanier, is not an authorized purpose of the Buford
project. Therefore, if the Corps’actions to support water supply constitute ‘major structural
or operational changes’ or ‘seriously affect’ the project’s authorized purposes, the Corps
was required to seek congressional approval for those actions and its failure to do so ren-
ders the actions illegal.” In re Tri-State Water Rights Litigation, 639 F. Supp. 2d 1308, 1347
(M.D. Fla. July 17, 2009) (internal citation omitted). “Thus, without any Congressional au-
thorization, the Corps has reallocated nearly a quarter of Lake Lanier’s conservation stor-
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have prevailed in contesting North Carolina’s IBT from the Catawba,
Georgia could have had grounds on which to sue, using a similar argu-
ment. And South Carolina has a much larger population and economic
base that relies more on Savannah water (i.e., the city of Greenville,
which is a hub in the Atlanta to Charlotte mega-region219) than it does on
the Catawba-Wateree. However, the fact that the U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers built and controls the Savannah dams could provide South
Carolina with a statutory apportionment argument analogous to the one
in Arizona v. California, should there be a parens patriae suit with Georgia.
If North Carolina had prevailed, Georgia could have made a move to
institute IBTs for Atlanta on the Savannah.
In addition to avoiding setting precedent with Georgia, the settle-
ment was the best possible outcome for the state of South Carolina and
possibly other parens patriae suits, in terms of promoting a cooperative
relationship at the state level on a shared watercourse, improving public
process in water management, and a more equal balancing of human
and ecosystem needs (and corresponding environmental protection). The
cooperation established in the settlement is a vast improvement over eq-
uitable apportionment, which potentially yields lower net economic ben-
efits in use of water that is reserved for an area anticipating growth.220
From an urban-planning perspective, the density and sustainability of
the growth on each side of the political border is the ultimate goal, so
that the associated natural resources are utilized most efficiently (and
preferably, minimally). Reserving a right in unused water to promote
single-family homes on large lots is much less efficient than supplying
water to a dense urban core with a lower environmental footprint.221 And
age to support water supply.” Id. at 1350. He also stated that “[a]t the end of three years,
absent Congressional authorization or some other resolution of this dispute, the terms of
this Order will take effect. For Atlanta and the communities surrounding Lake Lanier, this
means that the operation of Buford Dam will return to the ‘baseline’ operation of the mid-
1970s. Thus, the required off-peak flow will be 600 cfs and only Gainesville and Buford will
be allowed to withdraw water from the lake. The Court recognizes that this is a draconian
result. It is, however, the only result that recognizes how far the operation of the Buford
project has strayed from the original authorization.” Id. at 1355.
219. Catherine L. Ross & Myungje Woo, Identifying Megaregions in the United States: Im-
plications for Infrastructure Investment, in MEGAREGIONS: PLANNING FOR GLOBAL COMPETITIVE-
NESS 53–83 (2009).
220. Trelease, supra note 87. R
221. JOE DISTEFANO, ERIKA LEW, & GARLYNN WOODSONG, CALTHORPE ASSOCIATES, VISION
CALIFORNIA: MODELING CALIFORNIA’S FUTURE (2011), available at http://www.vision
california.org/reports.php (showing that residential water consumption is projected to
drop with higher density housing through smart growth and smaller lot sizes). See also
Jamie Patterson & Elizabeth A. Wentz, Forecasting Single-Family Residential Water Consump-
tion for Phoenix and Paradise Valley, Arizona, available at http://geodacenter.asu.edu/
system/files/200809_PattersonWentz.doc (GeoDa Ctr., Ariz. State Univ., Working Paper
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yet, should the uses in that reserved water be utilized more efficiently
than in the dense urban core, there is an argument for reserving that
right. But to simply reserve it on a competitive principle, or because of a
societal sense of entitlement and right, is a questionable use of the natu-
ral resource.
Arizona will not concede that Los Angeles may grow while
Phoenix must stand still, just because the cost of bringing
water to central Arizona is higher than the cost of taking it to
southern California. This emotional reaction of the people of
the state is transformed into a legal claim of the state to the
river, and this vestigial riparian claim, based on access to
water, has been elevated into a water right.222
South Carolina’s sense of entitlement caused the parens patriae litigation,
which is generally considered a last resort given the associated cost, an-
tagonism, and uncertainty in the resulting resource allocation, not to
mention the Court’s reluctance to take these cases and act as a trial court.
But in this circumstance, the litigation appears to have had utility in gen-
erating a beneficial outcome for all of the parties, which is something
that the prolonged drought, the CRA preparation, and the formation of
the Bi-State Commission had been unable to coalesce.
Despite the absence of a Court order, the environment invariably
prevailed through the pressure created by the proceedings and in the
settlement itself, comparable to the Native American intervenors in Ari-
zona v. California. While not a named party, the environment may become
the de facto winner in this legal dispute, with restoration and protected
quality and allocation that are prioritized over other uses on the Ca-
tawba-Wateree system, much like the Native Americans’ volumetric
boon. Although there were no federally reserved water rights involved
and a public trust doctrine argument was not employed,223 in the remedy
phase South Carolina could have argued that the minimum environmen-
tal flows established in S. 452 must be protected and balanced with the
other forms of benefits (primarily economic) accruing to each state from
the Catawba-Wateree River. Additionally, in 2008, the state legislature
amended the South Carolina Scenic Rivers Act to add “that portion of the
Catawba River located between the Lake Wylie Dam and the South Car-
2008–09) (showing that smaller lot sizes correspond to lower water consumption in hous-
ing units).
222. Trelease, supra note 87, at 167. R
223. See generally Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Sup. Ct. of Alpine Cnty, 658 P.2d 709 (Cal.
1983) (holding that the public trust doctrine provided an independent basis for the water
diversion challenge).
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olina Highway 9 bridge crossing of the Catawba River,”224 further pro-
tecting environmental quality and flows. These actions bolstered South
Carolina’s future harms argument, and effectively added another, albeit
silent, interest in the proceedings.
The environment was further protected through Duke Energy’s
intervention, which incorporated the CRA from the FERC relicensing
process. Although this is not a direct federal action, it will allocate the
system through the eventual FERC approval for flows and pool levels in
energy production, as well as federally mandated habitat and water
quality protection. In fact, the CRA establishes several forms of environ-
mental safeguards, the most important of which are the habitat flow
agreements associated with the flow and water quality implementation
plans.225 The CRA states that where dams have impacts in North Caro-
lina, Duke Energy will provide “100-foot wide perpetual conservation
easements (measured horizontally from the top of the bank) on approxi-
mately 22 bank miles,” as well as public access, open space, and trail
planning.226 There is a similar flow mitigation package in South Carolina,
with conservation easements on 5.5 bank miles and a $1 million environ-
mental mitigation fund to be maintained by the South Carolina Depart-
ment of Natural Resources.227 Minimum continuous flows, in cubic feet
per second, are to be maintained below each of the dams on the Ca-
tawba-Wateree system, although the LIP can temporarily modify them,
after notification to all interested parties.228 To meet flow and quality re-
quirements at each dam, the flow and water quality implementation plan
mandates consultation with state and federal resource agencies, and
FERC can alter the plan accordingly.229 Correspondingly, the CRA in-
cludes a water quality monitoring plan, and annual flow and reservoir
reporting to maintain accountability.230
Ultimately, the South Carolina v. North Carolina parens patriae law-
suit engendered a long-overdue awareness of, and improvement in,
water resources management and environmental protection on both
sides of the border. South Carolina and North Carolina became more
cognizant of the entire water system’s demands. According to Amy
Pickle of the Nicholas Institute for Environmental Policy Solutions at
Duke University in early 2010, “[t]he Carolinas are behind in water man-
agement. Now is a good time to make the transition to a more orderly
224. S.C. CODE ANN. § 49-29-230(9) (2010).
225. COMPREHENSIVE RELICENSING AGREEMENT, supra note 50, at 4-1. R
226. Id.
227. Id. at 4-2 to 4-3.
228. Id. at A-8 to A-11.
229. Id. at A-12.
230. Id. at A-13 to A-15.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NMN\51-2\NMN202.txt unknown Seq: 40  2-NOV-11 9:14
228 NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL [Vol. 51
water withdrawal policy.”231 With S. 452 in South Carolina and a settle-
ment focused on the CRA and the associated minimum flow volumes, as
well as drought-planning processes, it is less likely that unsustainable
development will be enabled as South Carolina’s consumptive uses
increase.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FURTHER RESEARCH
As in most water disputes, the basis of controversy for both Ari-
zona v. California and South Carolina v. North Carolina is a tradeoff of im-
mediate versus future growth potential. One state seeks to preserve
resources for future growth, usurping continued growth of a dominant
area (e.g., Charlotte, North Carolina, or Los Angeles, California), but at
an unknown social cost.
Quite possibly, on a comparison of the benefits and costs of
the uses in the two areas, it would be found that greater bene-
fits at less cost could be obtained from use in California, and
hence that the switch of the water to Arizona would be a de-
parture from the maximization principle. The nation would be
less well off, if tangible economic benefits alone were
counted. . . . So here, a strong California and a strong Ari-
zona may outweigh a still stronger California and a depressed
Arizona, although the total economic avoirdupois of the latter
combination is greater than that of the former.232
Like a trial court, the Supreme Court—through the Special Master—had
to assume the burden of distributing those costs and managing tradeoffs,
when they might better be left to the states—and their urban planners
and water managers—to negotiate themselves. According to the judge
who cut back Atlanta’s Lake Lanier water supply in the holding of In re
Tri-State Litigation,
[t]oo often, state, local, and even national government actors
do not consider the long-term consequences of their decisions.
Local governments allow unchecked growth because it in-
231. Stabley, supra note 184. In another development that could have influenced South R
Carolina’s harm argument and the remedy trial in the lawsuit, the Catawba Riverkeeper
Foundation and the Protect the Catawba Coalition, which comprises smaller municipalities
from both South Carolina and North Carolina, appealed the permit allowing North Caro-
lina’s contested IBT. They prevailed, and the cities of Concord and Kannapolis must lower
their withdrawal levels during drought. See Susan Stabley, Concord, Kannapolis Settle Ca-
tawba Water Dispute, CHARLOTTE BUS. J., Jan. 20, 2010, http://www.bizjournals.com/
charlotte/stories/2010/01/18/daily22.html.
232. Trelease, supra note 87, at 168. R
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creases tax revenue, but these same governments do not suffi-
ciently plan for the resources such unchecked growth will
require. Nor do individual citizens consider frequently
enough their consumption of our scarce resources, absent a
crisis situation such as that experienced in the ACF basin in
the last few years. The problems faced in the ACF basin will
continue to be repeated throughout this country, as the popu-
lation grows and more undeveloped land is developed. Only
by cooperating, planning, and conserving can we avoid situa-
tions that gave rise to this litigation.233
But the court system is increasingly becoming the locus of these deci-
sions in the absence of cooperation. And in making allocations that
change uses, associated property rights, and growth itself, the U.S. Su-
preme Court impacts the rest of the country’s water management.
Through the landmark precedent, settlement achievement, and
the elements within the settlement agreement itself, South Carolina v.
North Carolina will potentially alter the course of eastern water law. Ar-
guably, the stakes in this suit were as high as those in the Arizona v.
California suit because of the likely affect on IBT statutes on shared wa-
tercourses (particularly for growing urban consumers) and on the course
of the FERC relicensing process on contested interstate water bodies. Ad-
mitting the nonsovereign intervenors sets legal precedent and expands
the dimensions of the lawsuit, while providing the grounds for the settle-
ment. It also changed the state-federal relationship, with nonsovereigns
permitted in a suit traditionally limited to sovereigns (whether tribal,
state, or federal). Both the content of the settlement agreement, and the
settlement achievement itself provide a model for other cooperative ar-
rangements on interstate water bodies, and create a divergent but com-
parable modern legacy to Arizona v. California. But the settlement comes
with a caveat: the precipitating circumstances were quite fortuitous, and
may not be replicable; using litigation in lieu of negotiation is rarely
preferable.234
Both states, but particularly South Carolina, will be irrevocably
changed by the suit; it now has a long-awaited regulated riparian water
rights structure, a framework for cooperative state-level water manage-
ment, and a settlement that avoided precedent which could make South
Carolina vulnerable to challenge by Georgia on the Savannah. It also
spent millions of dollars and years of time to achieve these outcomes.
233. In re Tri-State Water Rights Litigation, 639 F. Supp. 2d 1308, 1355 (M.D. Fla. July 17,
2009).
234. But the ability to litigate must be preserved for times when negotiation fails or an
upstream state resists sharing. See GRANT, supra note 120, § 45.01, at 45-7. R
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Ultimately, the improved environmental protection (i.e., habitat
flow agreements, flow and water quality implementation plans, etc.)
may be analogous to the Native American intervenors’ allocation from
the federally reserved water right; both are the unintentional but pri-
mary beneficiaries of the litigation. The water management policy, law,
and institutions in both Carolinas are now catching up to their western
counterparts. Precipitated by drought and growth, this case should have
been avoided through compact, given the environmental, scenic, and ec-
onomic values associated with the Catawba-Wateree system in each
state. The most important legacy that can be transferred from Arizona v.
California and this suit is a need for, and focus on, holistic, basin-wide
sustainable and equitable water management policies between and
within states. Tools to realize such policies are now incorporated into the
Carolinas’ new legislation, institutions, and processes embedded in the
South Carolina v. North Carolina settlement agreement, all of which should
deter future litigation and promote scientifically- and process-based
growth patterns.
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APPENDIX
TABLE 1: Case Timeline for South Carolina v. North Carolina
SIGNIFICANT ACTION/EVENT DATE
South Carolina files a motion for leave to file complaint and an June 7, 2007
application for a preliminary injunction in the U.S. Supreme
Court.
North Carolina files response and opposition briefs in U.S. Supreme Aug. 7, 2007
Court.
U.S. Supreme Court grants South Carolina’s motion. Oct. 1, 2007
Duke Energy and CRWSP file motions to intervene and answer. Nov. 30, 2007
South Carolina opposes Duke Energy and CRWSP motions. Dec. 11 & 13,
2007
Kristin Linsley Myles appointed by U.S. Supreme Court as Special Jan. 15, 2008
Master.
City of Charlotte files motion to intervene. Feb. 1, 2008
South Carolina opposes City of Charlotte motion. Feb. 25, 2008
Hearing in front of Special Master Myles in Richmond, VA. Mar. 28, 2008
Special Master Myles issues an order granting limited intervenor May 27, 2008
status for City of Charlotte, CRWSP, and Duke Energy.
South Carolina files the Joint Case Management Plan, and both June 4, 2008
states file briefs concerning the Case Management Plan disputes.
South Carolina files a motion for clarification or reconsideration of June 27, 2008
the order granting limited intervention.
Special Master Myles issues first interim report to the U.S. Supreme Nov. 25, 2008
Court, reaffirming her order of limited intervenor status.
South Carolina files a motion for leave to file exceptions to the Dec. 9, 2008
Special Master’s first interim report with the U.S. Supreme Court.
North Carolina files an opposition brief to South Carolina’s motion Dec. 19, 2008
to file exceptions to the Special Master’s first interim report.
South Carolina files a reply brief. Dec. 22, 2008
Special Master Myles files the Case Management Plan in Case Jan. 7, 2009
Management Order No. 9.
South Carolina files exceptions to the Special Master’s first interim Feb. 13, 2009
report with the U.S. Supreme Court.
U.S. files an amicus curiae brief in support of South Carolina’s Feb. 20, 2009
exceptions to the Special Master’s first interim report.
Intervenors file individual replies to South Carolina’s exceptions. Mar. 9, 2009
North Carolina opposes South Carolina’s exceptions. Mar. 9, 2009
U.S. makes a motion to participate in the possible oral argument Mar. 10, 2009
for South Carolina’s exceptions to the Special Master’s first
interim report.
North Carolina and intervenors make a motion for a divided oral Mar. 23, 2009
argument, should it occur.
Oral argument before the U.S. Supreme Court. Oct. 13, 2009
U.S. Supreme Court holds that Duke Energy and CRWSP have met Jan. 20, 2010
the intervenor standard but City of Charlotte has not.
South Carolina requests reversal of order bifurcating proceedings Jan. 27, 2010
during telephonic conference.
(continued)
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(continued)
SIGNIFICANT ACTION/EVENT DATE
City of Charlotte makes a motion to participate as an amicus curiae. Feb. 19, 2010
North Carolina and intervenors support continued bifurcation. Mar. 12, 2010
North Carolina and South Carolina serve First Set of Contention Apr. 2, 2010
Interrogatories.
Hearing before Special Master Myles in Raleigh, NC, on the states’ Apr. 23, 2010
and intervenors’ bifurcation and discovery arguments.
Special Master Myles grants City of Charlotte’s amicus curiae June 16, 2010
motion.
South Carolina and intervenors file Letter Briefs on bifurcation. July 30, 2010
Telephonic conference with Special Master Myles in which she Aug. 20, 2010
introduces a new procedural structure and requests additional
briefing.
Bi-State Commission meeting in which the Duke Energy Aug. 27, 2010
Comprehensive Relicensing Agreement is presented as a possible
basis for settlement negotiations.
First Amended Case Management Plan filed with Special Master Oct. 20, 2010
Myles.
South Carolina, North Carolina, and the intervenors file briefs on Oct. 29, 2010
disputed issues in the First Amended Case Management Plan.
Joint Settlement Concept submitted to the Bi-State Commission for Nov. 12, 2010
public review.
Special Master Myles issues the Order Regarding Structure of Trial Nov. 17, 2010
and Discovery.
Telephonic conference with Special Master Myles on the terms of Nov. 22, 2010
the settlement concept and the implications for the litigation.
Settlement agreement signed by the states’ attorney generals, Duke Dec. 10, 2010
Energy’s associate general counsel and a vice president, and
CRWSP’s chief administrative staff person.
Stipulation to dismiss the bill of complaint and the U.S. Supreme Dec. 14, 2010
Court’s order of dismissal are signed and filed.
